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This paper is entitled " Advancement in Maritime Techno­
logy and its impact on safety".
In 1964 Diebold stated " THE EFFECTS OF THE TECHNICAL 
REVOLUTION WE ARE NOW LIVING THROUGH WILL BE DEEPER 
THAN ANY SOCIAL CHANGE WE HAVE EXPERIENCED BEFORE
It is twenty three years now since Diebold gave the 
statement and he surely could not be more right if a 
close look is conducted on what is happening today.
This paper is written with the aim of bringing to the 
people's awareness,the current level of advanced maritime 
technology and its impact on safety.
The methodology used has been collection of data from 
books, international and national organizations and firms 
through correspondence, proceedings from seminars, lectu­
res given in class, individuals, colleagues, etc. This 
data was then processed and compiled to form the paper.
/
The paper starts with an overview of the different 
transportation modes before going into the maritime 
industry.
The paper covers a wide range of the maritime industry 
but emphasis is given to what is happening at sea 
especially in the nautical field where the author spent 
thirteen years of his working life before embarking into 
teaching.
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Effects of advanced maritime technology towards safety 
are covered throughout the paper and examples have been 
given where more emphasis was deemed necessary.
The paper is slightly technical but very much within the 
scope of understanding of many people connected with the 
shipping industry.
The paper winds up with the following recommendations:-
1. Shipping should be given due consideration in all 
countries.
2. Governments should continue delegating 
responsibilities to non- government institutions where 
it is in the interest of all parties.
3. Technology based training should be used where 
appropriate.
4. The implications of purchasing highly sophisticated 
second hand vessels should be considered before doing it.
5. Technology must be allowed to advance.
6. A deep desire to prevent accidents must be cultivated 
to ail people involved with maritime affairs.
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Despite the advent of aircraft and the development of the 
land transport frail and road) by far the greatest part 
of the world's trade is still carried by the oldest of 
the three transportation modes which is the sea. It is 
also a known fact that the sea is up to this time the 
cheapest and the most efficient means of transport. 
Furthermore increased use of the sea arising from the 
exploitation of oil and gas in the seabed, coupled with 
continued needs of the fisheries,imposes ever more 
stringent demands upon -the mariner. Not only has the 
mariner's job been made harder by the introduction of 
larger, faster and more diverse ships, but also by their 
increase in number,sophistication of equipment due to 
increased technology and by obstacles to safe passage 
which now include man-made structures as well as shoal 
waters and rocks. Also one need not forget that 
commercial pressures for expeditious passage making do 
not diminish either.
Having recognised the heavy task with which the mariner 
is entrusted, all the help that is available must be 
given to him, to make his duty a successful one.
A successful duty means one that has been carried safely 
from all aspects of the word. That is, safe to human life 
and health, ship and cargo, navigation and environment, 
and economical to the operators. This involves a big 
group of different parties and undoubtedly of different 
goals/interests so to satisfy such a group may be close 
to impossible.
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The paper takes the view that many people assume that 
safety is universally desired and by implication that 
danger is something everyone wants to avoid. This assump­
tion is superficially true and often demonstratably fal­
se. Look at many popular sports which are-not far from 
commiting suicide (boxing, car racing,etc). Do accidents 
and disasters not fascinate a good number of people which 
a good safety record badly lacks! Isn't the appeal of 
hazard, danger and sudden death instinctive and part of 
man's historical heritage. How many people die everyday 
from the powers of small men! To quote Nietzsche, "A 
heart full of cheerfulness and courage needs a little 
danger from time to time or the world gets unbearable"- 
From Prince Charles,"There is enormous satisfaction in 
achieving something which is pjotentially hazardous and 
which requires concentration and self discipline". One 
then just wonders as to what man is actually up to. This 
leads to the suggestion that man reveals split personali­
ties towards questions of safety (Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde). 
The paper takes the view that many of us know that while 
we can completely banish some accidents,disasters and 
injuries, there would be other dangers. To quote Jung,"In 
view of the rapidly increasing avalanche of world popula­
tion, man has already begun to seek ways and means of 
keeping the rising flood at bay.But nature may anticipate 
all our attempts by turning man agaist his own creative 
mind. The H-Bomb for instance would put an effective stop 
to over population. In spite of our proud domination of 
nature , we are still her victims for we have not yet 
learned to control our own nature. Slowly but it appears 
inevitably we are courting disaster".
Jung could not be more right when we look at the number 
of people dying from self inflicted diseases like drug 
abuse associated diseases, or when we look at what 
happens frequetly from man's worst invention -the gun and 
the sophisticated improvements done on it both in quality 
and in damaging capability. Man will never fail to put a 
clause which will allow him or give him the excuse to 
show his negative'side of safety. An example of this is 
the surety that man had even when drafting the United 
Nations Charter,that complete peace is impossible. To 
quote part of a paragraph from the preamble to the 
charter,"To ensure, by the acceptance of principles and 
the institution of methods, that ac'med force shall not be 
used,SAVE in the common interests".Man hsd to put the 
clause so that when he needs it for his own good,he can 
justify its application and may be, defend it latter.
A man needs to be reminded that while complete safety is 
impassible to achieve, room for improving the current 
level of safety still exists and that given serious 
thought, consideration and positive approach towards its 
improvement,a safer level is within reach. It is the aim 
of this paper to show the accidents that happen at sea 
every year, their causes, and to elaborate on some of the 
contribution of advanced maritime technology towards 
safety and to give some recommendations.
1.1 SHORT HISTORY OF MARITIME TRANSPORT.
Recorded history fails to put an exact date when maritime 
transport started but all in all it can be said with cer­
tainty that it was very long time before Christ. The 
Aborigines are known to have crossed the Torres Strait 
from New Guinea to Australia as early as 4D,000 
BC.(Guinness book of Records 1986).
The following reasons must be among the many which 
prompted man to go to sea or over the water,
1 -Creation of Islands;
Man found himself separated from the other land 
which meant that he had to cross the water when 
he wanted to land over the other land for reasons 
like hunting, search for food, search for better 
land and also fights or wars for control of land.
2 -Something to do on the water, for example going
fishing and sometimes need arose when people had 
to go to fight against water-borne enemies like 
crocodiles.
3 -Carrying heavy objects by floating them on the
water,
Functions 1 and 2 played their biggest role in the ear­
liest period but they also have their history of develop­
ment, Function 1 developed into being a source for immi­
gration, sending troops and diplomatic parties, bussiness 
trips, studying abroad, carrying mail and press papers. 
This was the time when we had no cars, no aircraft, no 
public radio, no television etc. Of late function one's 
importance has been declining steeply. No longer do we 
have long distance passenger transport, nor is urgent 
information carried by ship any more. Function one is 
mostly left to Ferries and Cruise ships for holiday 
makers.
Function 2 is the one which has taken a very interesting 
turn. Man has found a lot to do on the water. Leaving 
aside the military use, man has developed technology 
which helps him in harvesting the resources that are
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either on water, within the water, on the seabed and 
under the seabed.
Floating docks and floating ports are things which man 
can now talk with ease. Erection of submersibles and 
laying of platforms for oil drilling are more examples of 
what is being done at sea. Another function of function 2: 
is the fishing industry where mankind is heavily depen­
dent upon fish for protein and expected to be so for a 
long time to come.
Lastly but not least for function 2 is the increase in 
number of pleasure crafts. * In 197S, state registered 
pleasure crafts in the USA numbered twelve million with 
approximately 20 million gross tons. At the same period, 
passenger boats and ferries in the whole world totalled 
about nine million gross tons. This pleasure yacht hobby 
is spreading worldwide and sometime in the near future 
yatching will have some impact on the maritime affairs.
Early awareness is very important for effective future 
plans.
As civilization developed , trade developed and merchants 
had to move to distant places in search for exchanging 
goods and for new markets. Discoveries of new goods were 
then.made and need for exporting and importing goods back 
home increased. This increased the importance of reason 3 
which resulted in the beginning of commercial shipping.
1.1 COMPETITIVENESS OF MARITIME TRANSPORTATION.
It is normally the case that when a new invention is 
brought into a system,for it to have maximum success then
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the old systems that existed before it are either 
scrapped or improvement to them is suppressed. To a cer­
tain extent, this was so in shipping. The inventions of 
land transport and air transport have had negative 
growth effect to shipping in an area like passenger 
traffic but what can positively be said is that there is 
still no doubt as to the importance of water transport.
Water can support heavy loads.
The same is neither true for land transport nor is it 
true for air transport. The ship is also the most effi­
cient carrier when you compare the tonnage she carries 
per given energy, with the other modes of transport.
The table below illustrates this.
CARGO CARRYING CAPACITY OF THE VARIOUS VEHICLES-
Type DWT Vkt HP DWT * Vkt/HP
Tanker 2D0000 13 18000 144
Bulker 60000 14 12000 70
General Cargo 20000 16 11000 29.
Cargo boat .^OODG 20 22000 IS
Cargo Train (Rail) 
Diesel Truck 
Cargo Jet
5 to 10 
2 to 3 
0.1 to 1
Where, DWT represents Deadweight in tons
Vkt is speed in knots <1 knot = 0.5144metres/sec 
HP is Propelling Horse Power <1 HP = 0.73AKw) 
ie Energy consumed per time.
DWT * Vkt/HP = Ton mile/HP * Navigation hours 
=Ton mile/Energy consumed.
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N AIR TRANSPORTATION MODE
Commercial air transport started in the 193Ds.
As a faster means of transport than the sea transport, 
important services which were urgent soon turned to the 
air transport mode. Mail which was only carried by sea 
now had the option of being air lifted. The same option 
was open to passengers. In 1937 Atlantic flights between 
Europe and North America were started. While it now takes 
about eight hours from Frankfurt to New York, it took 
twenty nine hours to perform the same operation by then.
As already indicated, improvements in the air transport 
have been rather fast when compared to the maritime 
transport. In 1947 the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) was formed. This is a UN specialized 
agency and its main objective is to make it safer and 
easier to fly from one country to another. This is done 
by updating and setting up of new safety measures to be 
applied by operators of airlines of its member states, 
setting up uniform regulations for the operation of air 
services and simpler customs, immigration and public 
health procedures at international airports.
1.3 LAND TRANSPORT
Land transportation is done by road transport vehicles 
and trains. It started by the turn of the 19th century. 
It complements the sea transport on land. With improve­
ments on highway construction and railway construction, 
more cargo is lifted between inland points easier than it 
was done before. Railways and roads have penetrated the 
work areas and factory premises. It is the second cheap 
mode of transport after maritime transport. Its regu-
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lations are mostly national to regional but not as inter­
national as the other two modes. The only transportation 
mode without an UN embracing body.
Technological improvements in this field are soon going 
to enable us to travel in trains running at 40Dkm/hour. 
These three transportation modes all offer services. 
After services have reached the customers,the next que­
stions of interest to the customers are quality of the 
service, efficiency of the service, reliability, safety 
of the service etc
The three transportation modes have all got their records 
of accidents which need improving by man through regula­
tions, public awareness,training, enforcement of law and 
through improvement of existing standards and technology. 
The paper would like to give an indication of the fatal 
accident rates of some activities again for public awa­
reness .
The fatal accident rate for the merchant navy is about 
3.5 * 10 " per person /hour
_9The fatal accident rate for flying is 6 * 10 per 
person/hour or per person/600 miles. Taking 600 miles 
per hour as the average speed of the aeroplane.
The fatal accident rate of car driving is 1.2 
per person /hour which is approximately 12 
per 600 miles.
The fatal accident rate in the chemical industry is about
—•I A5.8 * 10 per person /hour, the main reason for 
this seemingly low rate being the preventive measures 
that are taken in this industry.
* lo-*^
* 10”*^
a
This should improve when all the chemical \plants are 
protected by hoods so that leakages will be confined to 
small areas.
The motorcycle fatal rate is about 30 * 10""'^ p&’r per­
son /hour. Motorcycling is the worst activity of the ones 
that have been considered but the trend for all the fatal 
accident rates over the years has shown a big improvement
The fatal accidents rates above indicate the supremacy in 
safety level of the merchant shipping transport when com­
pared to the other transportation modes.
9
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2.1 SHIP TECHNOLOGY.
Improvements in the Structural Safety.
Structural safety depends upon the integrity of design 
principles, the validity of the calculations, the quality 
of the materials and the standard of their fabrication 
within the design concept and also on the degree of main­
tenance applied throughout the life of the structure.
2.1.1 SPECIFICATIONS AND DESIGNING.
A person wanting to build a new ship, will first have an 
outline of his specifications for the new ship. The foun- 
dejmental requirements beings- Type of ship, whether it is 
a bulk cargo, dry cargo, tanker, etc. Deadweight requi­
red, service speed, whether it will carry passengers or 
not. If it will carry passengers then the total number of 
passengers per class and accomodation requirement for 
crew and passengers will also have to be considered.
In addition to the above basic requirements the following 
specifications are also provided in most cases.
-Intended route and type of trade
-Limitations on ship dimensions; for example 
Length, Breadth, Depth and/or Draft.
-Ships class which enables the builder to know the
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Classification society regulations to be followed
-The flag State apiplicable rules and regulations. 
(These would normally be in addition to the 
existing international pequirements and the 
Classification Society's.)
-The kind of cargo that is going to be carried.
-Number of holds or tanks and capacities of each.
-Type of cargo handling gear if any.
— Special equipment/s for example the heavy lift 
gear
- Other requirements which have not been mentioned 
above.
From the above requirements, the design work commences, 
using the design principles. The designer, having obtai­
ned the preliminary dimensions of the ship, will now try 
to accurately estimate the amount of steel and outfit 
masses that will make up the lightmass of the ship. He 
will do his design optimisation which is intended to come 
out with the best ship which is within the requirements 
and also economical to run. He does this by varying the 
features of design such as length, breadth,draft, speed 
etc. The calculations involved in varying these features 
for optimal design are dimensionless and during the old 
time this was rarely done because they did not have the 
help of the computers to do these tedious lengthy calcu­
lations. Therefore the level of accuracy, thus safety was 
not as good as it is today.
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Having come to what is considered as the designed ship,a 
scaled mathematic^il model of the ship is built« The ship 
model is then taken to the towing tank for tests. Experi­
ments on static and dynamic behaviour of the prospective 
ship are carried out and the results recorded. Positive 
and negative responses will be indicated by the experi­
ments, and the behaviour of the ship will also be known.
Corrective measures will be done to thq spotted weak 
points until the vessel is structurally fit to perform 
the duties of her intended adventures.
The experimental findings are safely kept for future 
reference and consultancy. These records are not only of 
good use to the shipowner but also to the shipbuilder in 
future, in enabling him to produce a design at a 
competitive price.
An area which is still not satisfactorily explored is the 
structural optimization. The problem being to find a 
given strength of structure for the least mass or weight 
of material or for least cost. Substancial savings in the 
material and cost will result if a breakthrough will 
emerge from this research.
Advances in this section have moved us from older types 
of stems and sterns which were both unattractive and 
unscientific, to the modern ones we have today. The old 
knuckled counter stern saw itself changing to cruiser 
spoon, to cruiser spoon 2 and to full cruiser. The modern 
sterns are beautifully and gracefully rounded.
Yesterdays bow- the plumb bow- was straight, undistintive 
and unscientific. With its massive vertical bar, the 
result from collision was a long deep slash above and 
below the waterline of the unfortunate ship.
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This plumb bow had another unscientific characteristic in 
that its entrance was not fine thus increasing water 
resistance and pitching tendencies.
The newer bows - the raked or raking bow,the spoon bow, 
and the Meier form type, are not only beautiful,but have 
also increased economy and safety to their functions. The 
stem bar has been replaced by a fabricated or pirate bow 
which crumbles well above the waterline of the unfortuna­
te struck vessel, thus giving the struck vessel the pos­
sibility or probability of not flooding. These designs 
have improved the sea keeping behaviour of the vessels. 
Reduced water resistance from finer forms together with 
better hull designs have resulted in the increase of the 
average speed of merchant cargo vessels from 10 to 16 
knots.
The bulbous bow which is the latest bow design decreases 
water resistance at certain speeds. It is more effective 
for speeds between 16 or 17 knots and 22 or 23 knots. 
(John H . La Page : Modern ships Elements of their 
design, construction and operation. Page 10).
Building of the vessel commences after satisfactory 
results have been obtained from the experiments. Manufac­
turing of steel plates has been greatly improved and 
measurements of precise strength of steel plates is done 
to a very good standard. Protective measures to plates 
just after manufacture, during transportation from manu­
facturing plant to place of use, during storage period 
before use, during use and after leaving the shipyards 
are to an astonishingly high level which now does not 
call for high frequent maintenance attention as was done 
decades ago.
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Rivetted ships which dominated the initial history of 
steel ships have been replaced by welded ships.The manual 
manual cutting of steel plates, manual welding and time 
consuming tedious profiency check has been replaced by 
machine.
Thanks to modern technology, computer programmes do exist 
which command the machine to not only cut the plates to 
required shapes and sizes, but also cut them under water 
if required,weld the pieces and simultaneously test the 
quality of the weld. Standard has been reached whereby 
deformation of weld joint from poor workmanship is 
becoming forgotten.
The shipping industry may soon enter an era in which one 
may not be able to recognise a welded plate. How safe 
that is going to be is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Prefabrication of parts of ship and then joining the 
parts is the order of the day now. Yesterday's problems 
of joining plates of different materials eg steel and 
aluminium are now under control and it is not unusual to 
find a ship with more than four different materials in 
her. Improvements in this section have seen the 
dissapearance of right angled corners at the hatch 
coamings, other openings and sheer strakes in preferance 
to rounded up corners. Combinations of longitudinal and 
transverse framing,specially designed and built panting 
arrangements forward are all improvements under this sec­
tion .
Specially built vessels for special cargoes and trades 
has been made possible due to the technological advances 
done in this area. We now talk of gas tankers,SWASH, 
SWATH, RORO, WOWO etc.
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Reduction in scantlings due to near perfection of 
strength of steel measurement has left the shipowner 
with the same size of ship but with more carrying capa­
city. Some of these vessels leave a lot to be admired but 
the technology to make them is there.
Completion of shipbuilding is done after the ship has 
been launched. It is the last significant high risk 
operation in ship construction therefore we can regard it 
as the climax of shipbuilding. With the increase in sizes 
of ships,variations in shapes and design ,launching is no 
longer solely left to the shipbuilder.
2.1.2G0VERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES AND CLASSFICATION SOCIETIES
The role played by Governmental Authorities in the level 
of maritime safety in a country is very big.
The maritime policy of a country clearly indicates the 
extent at which that particular country wants to involve 
itself with its maritime affairs. In a country where 
maritime affairs have priority, a well defined maritime 
policy will be available. All maritime activities that 
need to be attended to will be outlined, plus the accep­
ted methods of attending to these activities.
From this policy, all parties interested in conducting 
maritime activities with that country or in that country 
will be able to roughly estimate their expected level of 
participation.
It is from this point that the paper would like to give 
all the credibility to the governmental authorities with 
regards to the remaining topics in this chapter.
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Without the blessing of the governments, establishment of 
Classification Societies, proper set up of education and 
training col leges,improvements on equipments, etc would 
hardly be possible. The paper takes the view that in 
dealing with different topics in this chapter, the 
government is in one way or another, directly or 
indirect1y invo1ved.
Ship safety can be divided into two main categories.
1. Structural safety • 2. Operational safety
Classification Societies mainly deal with structural 
safety. Classification societies came into existence in 
the ISth and 19th centuries when a need arose from all 
business interests connected with ship operations. These 
included owners, underwriters, shippers, consignees, 
bankers etc who accepted risks in varying degrees.
The main aim was to have indepent technical opinion on 
the fitness of the ship to trade, which meant thorough 
inspection of the ship and indicating weak areas which 
needed attention. By properly attending to these areas, 
the level of risks was reduced. One of the duties of a 
classification society is to attend to a ship during its 
whole life cycle. This means among other things, partici­
pation of the classification society during structural 
design, construction and during ship operations by enfor­
cement of class rules and regulations so as to maintain 
the class of the ship.
The vast knowledge, skill and experience that they have 
accumulated during their time of existence make them 
number one in the influence of design, construction and 
safety of ships.
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The governmental authorities do not only deal with opera­
tional safety but are also very much concerned with 
structural safety.
Since unnecessary duplication of responsibilities is a 
waste of resources and benefits nobody, and that the work 
of the Classification Societies and governmental autho­
rities overlap to a certain extent, governments often 
delegate authority to Classification Societies. A good 
example of this is the government authority's acceptance 
of the strength of a ship as being adequate if it was 
built to the rules of such a Society. A lot of research 
in different desciplines in the field is carried out for 
better performances of the future ship.
2.2 ' TRAINING TECHNOLOGY •
The time for walking, talking and chalking is becoming 
history in many big institutions. Technological advances 
in the training systems involves inter alia, expenditure., 
In a system in which cost involvement exists, cost/bene­
fit analysis plays a major role in the negotiations.
In training, cost/benefit analysis plays three major 
rol.es! planning, selection and justification.
As regards this paper, planning would mean estimating the 
anticipated costs of different training programs iei 
traditional classroom lecture approach programs and 
modern technology based programs.
For selection it means evaluating one training approach 
relative to another in terms of costs and outcome. In 
this paper outcome is to be construed among other things, 
as doubtless compliance with relevant international rules 
and regulations, relevant national rules and regulations 
and requirements from the industry.
17
When used for justification, cost/benefit analysis should 
mean the ability to measure the effects of a particular 
training program, especially in terms of improved job 
performance.
When a training centre is established, at one time or 
another, evaluation of the three major roles played by 
cost/benefit analysis will be carried out and comparison 
of two or more approaches to the same training need will 
likely be necessary.
Different cost/benefit models have been developed to meet 
these different purposes. They are normally general in 
nature and apply to almost all training approaches or 
applications,however their accuracy and validity depends 
on the accuracy of input of assumptions made and the 
variables that are included in the particular training 
technology involved. For example, when computer based 
instruction is costed, it is of paramount importance to 
ensure that the model covers all the necessary compo­
nents ( Hardware, Software,Courseware,Humanware etc) and 
that assumptions are made about degree of usage and life 
span of equipment/human match.
The cost/benefit of using technology in training exhibit 
some major differences when compared to traditional 
classroom lecture approach.
As indicated in the figure below, technology based trai­
ning program approach has higher start up costs but lower 
ongoing cost while the opposite is true for traditional 
classroom lecture program approach.
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oneTo strike a better deal in chosing training program, 
needs to consider the duration of the course and the 
anticipated life span of the demand for that course or 
the equipments. National and/or non - national academies 
are established to last for life if possible and nautical 
education has never stopped since being established and 
probability for failure Cie probability that nautical 
education will be discontinued ) does not exist at moment
IF A/F ALL A6FEF TO THIS, THEN TEE A/OTTO SHOULD BE TO 
FULLY SUPPOFT TECHHOLOEY BASED IHSTPUCTIOH PPOSPAA/S.
Cummulative
Training
Costs
Course relationship between instructor and Technology 
based Training.
Source; Training Technology Page 153
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2:2:1 SELECTION OF TRAINEES„
Having decided on the training program model the estab­
lishment is going to follow,including the objectives of 
the particular course, the next important thing is get­
ting the appropriate candidates for the course.
Since modern training is technologically orientated,the 
prospective candidates must be technologically sound to 
their required entrance level. The paper suggests stu­
dents who have done the last examination before joining 
the University as the appropriate ones. They must have 
taken science subjects. Physics,Chemistry and Mathematics 
should be in their scope of knowledge.
Such candidates are expected to be able to manage the 
workload of the course. These people must be physically 
fit and mentally sound.
Old selection was based on defined standards on academi­
cal /prof essional knowledge and skills, health and body 
fitness. To be able to cope with the anticipated ship of 
the future these requirements must be completed by an 
examination of the psychical structure.
Knowledge on psychological selection can be acquired from 
other transport systems where this selection is obligato­
ry c; Aviation ) .
We now talk of deck - engine bivalence, ship -shore biva­
lence, future ship, reduced manning to an officer/ratings 
ratio of below one and where total complement may not. 
exceed 10 (ten) people. These factors plus the trails 
that go with them must be known to the candidates and the 
interviewers must also make sure that they choose candi­
dates whom they positively think,at least at that time.
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that they will perform what is expected of them. It 
should be remembered that proper selection can help the 
candidates to avoid a wrong decision and in consequence 
to evade an unhappy,unsuccessful life at sea and it would 
in principle, support the efforts to reduce accidents and 
improve safety at sea.
2:2:2 SYLLABI AND FLEXIBILITY OF COURSES OFFERED TO 
MATCH DEMAND AND MEET OBJECTIVES.
Syllabi development is a difficult task.It needs a lot of 
input from different sources.
Important points to be remembered when developing one,in 
a time experiencing rapid changes,are:
to make it as broad as possible so that it can accomodate 
changes without itself being changed,
it should be designed to suit its objectives.
A syllabus developed for watchkeeping certificate shall 
be so designed such that a graduate can confidently keep 
a safe watch. The aim of the training is to make the 
training/job gap as small as possible.
This is not easy because it involves many inputs eg col­
lege staff, equipments plus system of training, adminis­
trations system of education, developments in the indus­
try, location of institute with • regards to location of 
industry, availability of experts at and/or near location 
of institute etc.
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2:2:3 SELECTION OF TRAINING EQUIPMENT
Depending on where the college or institute is 
located,and the customers of the college, and also the 
availability of funds for the purchase of equipments, a 
college should have the latest equipments available in 
the market, supported by the old equipments which may 
still be featuring in the industry. These are in addition 
to the recommended equipments for the given courses as 
stipulated in the STCW 1978 convention of IMO.
Example.
Dar es salaam Maritime Training Unit COMTU) in Tanzania 
is the only well established maritime training centre in 
East, Central and Southern Africa which offers courses 
leading to all certificates of competence except Class 2 
and Class 1. If DMTU stocks itself with equipments inclu­
ding many which only feature in class 2 and class 1 
courses then that would not be a perfectly planned 
expenditure because the cost/benefit analysis on justifi­
cation can not be satisfactorily explained. But if the 
industry uses these equipments effectively and that funds 
are available,then no sound reason exists for them not 
being purchased.
Colleges can be very influential to the industry with 
regards to standard of equipments,especially in less 
developed regions. While the paper admires shoulder by 
shoulder progress between colleges and the industry, it 
also understands the problems involved in achieving this 
and thus continuity of the training /job gap. In develo­
ped regions it is normally the industry which is way 
ahead of the colleges but in the less developed regipns 
you would find that the colleges are ahead of the
industry especially if the colleges are foreign suppor­
ted. In such a situation,it would pay a lot if the colle­
ge and the industry work out means of reducing this gap.
CDevelopment with respect to regions as refered above is 
only in the context of maritime education and training.)
It is the papers assumption that all readers understand 
the problem of training with highly sophisticated equip)- 
ments which are also more convenient to use and being 
taken to work with equipments of much less quality and 
performance stcindard.
The paper suggests the equipments selected to have inter 
alia the following as part of their characteristics5 
Realiabi1ity, high availability, high accuracy and nobi- 
1ity shouId be just right.
Nothing frustrates both lecturer and students like the 
breakdown of equipment in the middle of an exercise, 
having an equipment which works o)Tly twice a week and 
these two times are not known, and carrying out research 
on an equipment whose accuracy is doubtful.
9 •? 4II «l^ II UPGRADING
Literature on human study has indicated that out of the 
100 % that is taught to a person, only one third remains 
in the memory clearly while the rest is blurred- With 
routine work, if this work involves greater than the one 
third then you are a lucky man but majority of routine 
workers do not use all of this one third therefore to 
them part of this one third easily joins the blurred 
part. To keep this 67 % in focus for quick retrieval, one 
needs to read professional journals frequently, to keep 
contact with books and keep himself well on his toes not 
to be left far behind by the fast changing technology.
Many of the International and National institutions have 
recognised this and effectively acted on it.
IMO recommendations on this are contained in the STCW 
1978 Convention, but colleges do also conduct independent 
refresher courses which mostly assist in bridging the gap 
between past knowledge and experience, and current 
developments in the education and industry.
It can be done by short courses but these courses are 
very demanding and costly because for them to be effecti­
ve experts are needed and often this calibre of people is 
from the industry.
The paper suggests close links between college and 
industry and to start such demanding courses from that 
point of understanding.
Upgrading is comforting, selfsatisfying,increases
confidence, efficiency and eventually increases safety.
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2 • 3 SHIPBOARD TECHNOLOGY
The most attractive place on board the ship is the brid­
ge » Whether it gains this popularity from the fact that 
it is the commanding post of the ship's business or from 
its strategic positioning / location or from the items 
that are instaled in it is left for individual opinion.
The bridge, its contents and its wings have gone through 
many design changes all intended at making it more 
convenient for the seafarer to perform his duties and 
consequently increase the safety level.
253:1 NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS
The traditional navigational equipments have been the 
compasses (magnetic compass and the gyro),the sextant, 
which went through Backstaff, Quadrant and Octant stages 
before reaching the present level,the chronometer which 
is also giving way to modern Quartz chronograph clocks, 
echo sounder being technological advancement of the? 
sounding rod and the lead line-. Directional f inder, radar, 
steering wheel etc.
Vessels using the above systems still exist but a lot of 
improvements have been introduced to increase the accura­
cy of navigation with the aim of making available precise 
decision making data for the navigator and minimise acci­
dents .
The position fixing has been highly improved by the 
availability of electronic aids to navigation which 
mainly include Sonar navigation, speed measurement, 
Decca navigator, Loran C, Omega, Navigation by
Satel1its,Integrated navigation systems,the ship's
compass, Automatic steering. Direction finder and Radar,
We can devide these navigational aids into three main 
groups: --
1. Short range navigational aids which use ground wave 
as their mode of message transportation. A very 
accurate positon fixing system when weather condi­
tions are ambient. Suitable for coastal navigation 
and in estuaries, where precise positions are a 
necessity. Decca,Loran A and Loran C are among them.
2. Long range navigational aids which use skywave 
transmittion, Omega is one of these. The accuracy of 
this system is not comparable to Decca and Loran C, 
but for its area of coverage, the accuracy it offers 
may be considered good enough.
3. The latest development in position fixing is 
Satellite navigation. With precision in time keeping, 
accuracy of this system is very high. Proper under­
standing of the system is very important because the 
accuracy of the position depends on the input that is 
fed to the computer or equipment. Wrong inputs in DR 
position, GMT time, Antenna heights etc will aid in 
giving the user a wrong position.
This is in addition to Satellite errors which include 
disobidience to follow the precomputed path.
One of the main problems in this sector is that 
satellites have a life period, like human beings. But the 
big difference comes in the fact that the effects of
their destruction after their useful time is yet not 
clear.
Accuracies of the Gyro compass and the Automatic steering 
are some of the features which help in keeping a convi— 
nient watch as machines can be more relied upon than man. 
Failure alarms must be incorporated for early detection 
of unfavourable developments.
Speed measuring logs have been accurate enough when 
considering their principle of operation but the 
tranverse motion measuring logs are definitely below the 
accuracy indicated in the catalogues. The beauty with 
this system is that it is not employed to considerable 
use by the merchant vessels.
Echo sounders have been of great assistance especially 
in shallow waters. However the positioning of the 
transducers could be moved more towards the bow where the 
ships smell the ground earlier than any other part of the 
sh i p.
Anticipated development to soon come to the bridges of 
merchant vessels are the electronic charts. These will do 
away with the paper charts and all the publications that 
go with them. Discs will be available which will carry 
all navigation information and correction of the data 
carried in these electronic charts will be able to be 
done by satellites. This system is used by some war 
ships.The only obstacle . which the author found when 
visiting one firm making these electronic charts is the 
fact that the charts are done by digitising the current 
charts. The problem is the carrying forward of errors 
contained in that chart.
The screen was also too coloured for eye comfort.
More information shown on the screen causes clutter 
which blunts its effectiveness.
Since computers can not yet handle large amounts of data 
fast, reduction of data is important to increase ease of 
processing and retrieval of data on display.
Some problems can be anticipated from this early stage 
and one of these problems is the seafarer having much 
less information displayed on the screen against lots of 
information seen outside especially on coastal waters. It 
still is a great step towards modern electronic naviga­
tion and once enforced inprovements should move it to 
safer and safer levels.
Radar is the navigator's extended eye.
The Raster scan radar screen provides the clearest echo 
that a radar can give. Screens are also offered in 
different colours for different objectives giving more 
choice to the users.
This has been made possible because the screen is divided 
into small pixels. Each pixel has an X / Y co-ordinate 
and can be addressed. Discrimination depends on number 
of pixels and area filling like colouring an area can be 
done since the possibility of addressing each pixel 
exists.
The following are some of the advantages of the Raster 
scan radar.
-Bright display
-Suppression of disturbances
-High resolution flicker free; high contrast pic­
ture
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-Superimpose additional synthetic radar
information eg ARPA, Target trails,etc
-Can display on same screen - status of radar
-•own ship data
-Performance / Safety - TV tube more reliable than
conventional tube 
- Self tests by computer
-Possibility of colour radar
-Adaptive radar controlled auto pilot < ARCAP ) 
-----  > Automatic track keeping
-Will eventually be cheaper
All these developments are intended to help the seafarer 
to excecute his job with highest accuracy possible and 
with minimum stress. The seamen should be helped more 
though, by being given more information with regards to 
the probability of failure of these equipments. Apart 
from Anschutz and a very few others, most manufacturing 
companies of electronic navigational aids do not indicate 
the mean time between failure of their components. The 
danger brought by this is making the poor seamen sail 
with equipments which they have no idea at all of their 
probability of failure.
2:3:2 • CARGO EQUIPMENTS
The sole reason for operating a merchant vessel is to 
carry cargo from one place to another profitably,and 
without misfortunes in between. This means being able to 
load the vessel safely and to safely transport the cargo 
to its port of destination, and finally to discharge the 
cargo safely.
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General cargo vessels have been the the only unfortunate 
ones to still have equipments which are for general pur­
poses but specialised vessels have specialised cargo 
equipments for their types of trade. Specialised cargo 
equipments are easy to deal with due to the fact that the 
area they cover is very limited while general equipments 
have the disadvantage of. trying to cope up with many 
types of cargoes. Improvements in this area include the 
capability to work more cargo within a given time and the 
capability to cope up with varying conditions and stan­
dards of different ports. Lessons learned from accidents 
involving the securing of heavy lift derricks and cargo 
securing have resulted in recommendations on cargo secu­
ring from IMO.
Specialisation of ships and cargo has made it easier to 
locate sources of accidents and this may explain the rea­
sons why general cargo ships are having the highest acci­
dent rate compared to the other ships.
2:3:3 COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS
Advancement in modern technology in this area is finally 
taking out of business the man who at one time was as 
important as the Master on board the ship.
The traditionnal radio officer is leaving the ship with 
his make and break system of communication. The 
availability of communication equipments as indicated in 
annex 1 renders the traditional radio officer redundant 
in modern ships.
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•T-’ ■ 4iv. ■ “ SHOREBASED TECHNOLOGY
Successful execution of the voyage is completed when the 
vessel discharges her cargo safely. Ocean navigation has 
to be complemented by coastal navigation to complete the 
voyage. It is here where shorebased technology plays its 
major role.
2:4:1 SHOREBASED NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
The shorebased radio navigational aids can be considered 
fully covered in 2:3:1 above. The other main contributors 
to position fixing are the light buoys, light houses, 
light vessels with racon,ramark and radar reflector 
characteristics. Refusal of a light to be seen beyond 
five miles while its range of visibility is thirty miles 
is not uncommon at sea depending on the existing weather 
condition. The situation can be worsened if the reliabi­
lity of the light is reduced by one reason or another.
The introduction of the possibility of having six bulbs 
fitted to a system such that if the working bulb goes 
faulty, the system automatically changes to another bulb 
thus increasing the availability of the service and also 
reducing risks to safety due to fact that replacements 
of bulbs can be planned to be done during a calm sea 
period.
Below example should help to indicate the importance of 
this point.
If a lighthouse has bulbs with the mean time between
failure being two months for each bulb, then the probabi­
lity of failure = P (fail!) = (1 - ©“"t/S-ja
t =time in question. Power of a outside the bracket
indicates the number of bulbs.
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Example Let a 1
To find the probability of success of a bulb after one 
month, 2 months, 3 months, 4 months.
P Cfail) = ( 1 - since a -= 1,
when t = 1
PCf) = C 1 - 0.39
Since P (s) success = 1 - P (f) then PCs) = 0.61
When t = 2 P <s) = 1 “■ 0.63 = 0.37
When t = 3 P Cs!) = 1 ” 0.78 = 0.22
When t = 4 P (s) = 1 - 0.86 = 0.14
With
Cl -
six
e“t/
bulbs, the 
2 .,6
probability of failure - PCf) ^
When t “ 1 month P C f) = 0.004 PCs) = 0.996
When t = 2 months PCf!) = 0.064 PCs) = 0.936
When t = 3 months P (f ;> = 0.22 PCs) = 0.78
When t = 4 months PCf) = 0.42 PCs) = 0.58
The above example clearly indicates the contribution of 
modern technology in increasing the availability of a 
navigational aid, increase in number of position fixing 
possibilities, increase in efficience and confidence and 
decreasing the risks of navigation which means inter 
alia, increase in safety.
2.4 VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS.
The main aim of vessel traffic management systems is to 
improve safety and efficiency. A system which is fully 
exploited in air transportation. At sea this is done in 
two ways. There are internationally recognised vessel 
traffic management systems and national systems. While we 
have both horizontal and vertical separation in air, at 
sea there is only horizontal separation of vessels. As 
such, up to this moment vessel traffic management system 
is mainly involved with traffic lanes, separation zones 
etc. Vessels navigating in international traffic schemes 
are bound by international law or agreement to follow the 
requirements of the particular scheme.
Monitoring,supervision and surveillance of area to ensure 
that regulations are not contravened is done by the 
coastal states adjacent to those waters. The setting up 
of these traffic separation schemes has reduced traffic 
density resulting in marked decline in risk of danger. 
This has been made possible by the fact that while it was 
usual for ships to converge towards one point in search 
of getting a proper fix C eg Ushant light house) and 
continuing with the voyage.The authorities took the 
seafarers requirements into consideration and came up 
with a solution that fulfilled his requirement and made 
it safer for him by reducing congestion and setting 
proper routes of approach /progress.
The diagram at the appendix from Seaways March 1987 Page 
15 enlightens the point.
Other requirements of VTMS are constant lookout and radio 
listening watch, and reporting of incidences.
It is the best system for easy location of vessels and 
thus easy reach to them during ordinary time and 
emergencies.
Like all systems, its problems include non compliance 
from those who are ignorant of them and from some who for 
one reason or another have to break them.
Strict enforcement of the rules has to be complied with 
which requires among other things, clear recognition of 
the benefits in obeying the rules,from all the relevant 
decision makers.
For VTMS to be fully appreciated like in aviation, the 
legal problems concerning responsibilities of the ship 
when under VTMS must be solved. At moment VTMS is done by 
the use of traffic separation schemes, exchange of 
information to coastal stations in some areas,picking up 
of pilot/master for safety navigation during thick fog in 
places like Rotterdam.
The following are some of the problems which administra­
tions intending to install the system should carefully 
observe. C These are personal.)
- Two targets can be merged into one on a screen
- One target can be split into two or more.
The above are due to the size of the 
mathematical model used in the targets.
- Obscuring of targets
- False echoes - mainly due to reflectors -
. The solution here is having more than one 
radar because these echoes can not be seen in 
both radars at the same time. But then the 
possibility of ignoring a real target exists 
which may not be given enough weight until it 
is too late.
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’ - Sea clutter is common in radars.
By the scan to scan correlation technique the 
sea clutter can be rejected. It will be 
necessary to store the whole radar picture for 
this function to be carried out.
VTMS has three main modes:—
It can be used for passing information only
- It can be used for giving advise - especially 
if a pilot is behind the screen of the shore- 
based VTMS centre.
It can also be used for giving orders -- if the 
VTMS centre assumes full responsibility of the 
vessel.
The preventing of a near imminent aeroplane accident 
whereby the pilot had for some reason not released the 
undercarriage in mid July 1987 at Heathrow airport deser­
ves full credibility to the Air traffic controllers. Had 
not the control tower station warned the pilot in ample 
time (less than four minutes before landing), it would 
have been a different story altogether.
2:4:3 GLOBAL MARITIME DISTRESS AND SAFETY SYSTEM.
The concept of this system is to rapidly alert shorebased 
search and rescue authorities, as well as shipping in the 
immediate vicinity of the ship in distress, to the dis­
tress place so that they assist in a co-ordinated search 
and rescue operation with the minimum delay.
This will be done by establishing a global plan for 
maritime search and rescue (SAR) on a framework of
3B
multilateral or bilateral agreements between neighbouring 
states on the provision of SAR services in coastal and 
adjacent ocean waters to achieve cooperation and mutual 
support in responding to distress incidents.
The system will also provide for urgency and safety 
communications and the dissemination of marine safety 
information, including navigational and meteorological 
warnings.
2:4:4 SEARCH AND RESCUE.
Governments are required to set up search and rescue 
organisations whose work is to search for and provide aid 
to persons who are or are feared to be in need of 
assistance.
It is normally executed by ships at sea, search and res­
cue organisations which have facilities for air,maritime 
and coastal search and rescue.
Regional co-ordinating centres are set up and each centre 
is assigned an area of operation. However co-ordinating 
centres often co-orporate in search and rescue opera­
tions. It is a very hard job, very demanding and it can 
be very costly for the not well to do nations. To reduce 
the burden on individual countries, mutual, agreements 
between nations are highly encouraged for optimisation of 
resources and a gain in the increase of the safety level.
The IMO Search and Rescue Manual CS R Ml is a necessity 
for all administrations and individuals who are eager to 
get the details of the service with regards to setting up 
search and rescue organisations, and the search and 
rescue procedures. Similar publications are available 
from some of the developed maritime nations.
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The human being is the most advanced living creature on
earth. He uses all his brains to make good use of his
environmental resources. The land is where we all think 
we belong but the land is becoming scarce everyday to an 
extent that in some areas like Japan, land reclaimation 
is public knowledge.
Water occupies about three quarters of the earth's 
surface and from the sea,human being extracts building 
materials, mineral resources, food, energy, etc.
But nature has put risks to almost all activities done on 
land and elsewhere and unfortunately this includes
maritime activities as well.
Maritime accidents can be categorised as foundering,
stranding, collision, explosion / fire and others. Before 
the author goes further with accidents analysis, it would 
be appropriate to let the readers know who are the
contributors of a safe passage. The elements that make 
the domain of a safe passage are the seafarers, ship and 
cargo, weather, and regulations.
The ship shall be so designed and constructed such that 
she can carry without constraints, her intended cargo.
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The problems of securing of containers are substantial on 
board a ship designed to carry cargoes other than 
containers.
Likewise a container vessel is most competent and 
convenient for the carriage of containers and nothing 
else. The moment diversion of cargo is made from the one 
originally designed for, the level of compatibility of 
ship and cargo is reduced and this will be the beginning 
of problems.
Seafarers should be capable of operating the ship), her 
equipments and all the machinery. They should be able to 
navigate the vessel from point A to B within the expected 
perils of the sea.They should be proper husbands of the 
ship. Job description should be well defined and 
accountabi1ity enforced to the maximum. Proper match of 
seafarers and ship type and trade should be aimed for. 
This casts a lot of doubt to the credibility of dual 
officers and dual ratings.
Weather: Nothing much can be done about the weather
except praying for the weather forecasting stations to 
send you as near pjerfect predictions as possible so that 
appropriate measures can be taken to avoid catastrophic 
incidencies. It is the author's wish that technology will 
advance to such a level as to diffuse a depression, 
tropical revolving storms and other disturbing effects 
that the seamen dread for.
Regulations: The most effective element of the four if 
they are enacted by genuine people who understand the 
problems to be solved, and if they establish workable 
solutions which are tirelessly implemented, enforced and 
that those who infringe the regulations are properly
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dealt with for the benefit of safety and all«
3.1 TYPES OF SHIPS AND ACCIDENTS
Most accidents are associated with particular activities. 
Therefore one of the approaches of reducing accidents is 
by categorizing the activities or accidents and dealing 
with individual groups. Since the paper is mainly 
concerned with maritime safety, the author wishes to 
divide the merchant ships into three main categories.
- Tankers : which include among others, liquid 
bulk petroleum tankers, chemical tankers,gas 
tankers etc.
- Dry bulk and combined carriers
General cargo ships which in this paper 
includes ROROs, container ships, ferries and 
passenger ships. Fishing vessels may be 
included in some paragraphs for the purpose of 
awareness only, but they are not intended to 
form part of the main aim of the paper.
3.2 CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS
In section 2:1s3 ship safety was divided into Structural 
safety and operational safety. One of these has to go 
wrong for a risk of danger to exist.
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3:2:1 OPERATIONAL SAFETY HAZARDS„
The hazards under this heading which had led to accidents 
in recent years can be grouped as follows;- 
Authorities, Management and Manning.
Authorities
The authorities are the supreme body of the operational 
safety in that, they are the ones who set the 
regulations,rules etc which govern the standards to be 
achieved and the procedures to be followed to reach such 
standards of safety.
The authorities in performing their duties and with the 
awareness of their responsibilities, need the maximum of 
understanding of how to reach the optimum safety level 
with the available resources.
It is not uncommon in some areas, to have very good 
regulations, rules and recommendations yet when one comes 
to reality, he finds out that with the available 
resources, these regulations,rules and recommendations 
are near impossible to implement. The result will be a 
tendency of different operators operating at different 
levels of safety which does not serve the purpose. The 
paper also brings into view, the tendency of some 
authorities concentrating on commercial shipping and 
forgeting the safety side of it.
While the author sees no objection to authorities being 
involved with commercial shipping ,due regard shall be 
given to safe shipping. Safe shipping within their 
jurisdiction navigable waters and within their ports.
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Management and manning.
Generally, an aeroplane or jet owner will fly with two 
pilots in his own jet. Owners and managers of shipping 
companies rarely travel on board their ships. As a result 
they ape never present when ships experience problems. 
They always get an away from the scene information which 
can never be compared to an own eye observation.
Ship management requires among other conditions, shore 
based staff with necessary expertise to oversee safe 
marine operations. In recent years the author is aware of 
some shipping companies managed by shore based staff who 
have never worked at'sea nor did their former jobs have 
any connections with the sea. It does not imply that they 
are or were incompetent, but it pauses serious doubts as 
to their capability and willingness to discuss seriously 
with the seafarers on matters of mutual interest.
Communication becomes very complicated because the 
vertical levels of understanding of the matters of common 
interest are very far apart. The transitional period from 
zero shipping knowledge to acceptable level is normally 
too long since shipping is very complex and highly 
unpredictable. This period is a very dangerous period.
Shore / Sea staff job understanding gap should be reduced 
to the minimum so that the benefit of compatibility can 
be enjoyed by all. Horizontal compatibility should be the 
level to aim for.
It is also not uncommon to find ships manned by untrained 
inexperienced officers who have obtained "CERTIFICATES" 
without examination.
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A practise which is very dangerous since these officers 
are entrusted with peoples lives and property when they 
are on watch. The ^^luthor would appreciate the setting up 
of a global standard for shore based maritime personel.
The manning of ships is often done by agents who take no 
responsibilities for the successful outcome of the 
voyage. The human element of supplying crew which may not 
be the best one can easily overcome the agent. The agent 
may also not know how well this crew will manage in the 
ship, since he may not know the level of automation of 
the ship. It should i^lso be remembered that taking an 
incompetent man to sea is exactly the same as giving him 
an overdose of sleeping tablets. His chances of causing 
accident to himself, others and /or to the ship and her 
cargo are just as great as the chances of the overdosed 
person continuing to sleep forever.
With recent economical unrest to individuals, companies 
and governments, ships have been hit by the less manning 
desease. While less manning is not bad in itself, how 
less and the influence of this how less to safety is the 
big question. Cases have occured where evidence existed 
beyond doubt that a particular accident could have been 
avoided if the manning was adequate. Adequate is relative 
and it can be construed differently by two different par­
ties. Consultations with authorities should be sought of 
before reaching a conclusion on the ship's required crew 
number.
Unfortunately cases -have also existed whereby owner 
induced loss of ships and cargo eg maritime fraud, 
deliberate stranding and scuttling, have taken place.
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Long Hours
Research by Breslow and Buell <1960!) indicated a 
relationship between working long hours and coronary 
heart disease mortality. Findings indicated that subjects 
of less than 45 years working over 48 hours per week have 
twice the risk of death from coronary heart disease 
compared with similar sample but working 40 hours or less 
per week. The minimum number of hours seafarers work per 
week is 56.
Shift Work-
Shift work which involves night shift is also a major 
contributor to stress. A shift worker has to balance 
sleep, social and family life and circadian rhythms. 
These factors are all interelated and a problem in one 
may lead to negation of the positive effects of success 
achieved in the others. < Monk and Folkard <1983!)).
Stress and strain to seamen from overstaying on board 
ships without being replaced is another factor which 
contributes risk of accidents. This may sound impossible 
to places where seamen are relieved every fortnight 
<North Sea ) and every four months in foreign going ships 
of some countries, but places do still exist where seamen 
go on a stretch of over a year before leave.
Age of seafarers also play a big role to accidents.
Stress can be traced to be prominent to a season of a 
man's life. < Valerie . J . Sutherland )
Modern technology on board ships will hardly replace 
shift work. Its influence on the reduced manning scale
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will in one way or another contribute to longer hours of 
duty than now. Already fatigue is a main topic to 
officers of vessels trading in North Western Europe. An 
average of 20 working hours per day for three days is now 
. normal. It will not be long before the public learns of 
the negative side of advanced technology in this 
respect.
Accidents due to fatigue are imminent and if this trend 
is not checked then safety is very much endangered.
Compatibility between younger officers who are 
technologically oriented and older traditional officers 
who do not accept changes easily. Good workmanship 
relation sometimes lacks due to this difference in levels 
of technological understanding.
Another part which comes under the operational safety 
is the cargo. While specialised ships have their 
dedicated cargoes, the problem of putting the rest of the 
cargo in general cargo carriers explains the higher 
accident rate of general cargo ships. Cargoes have been 
increasing faster in specialization than the ships 
dedicated for them and a dangerous transitional period 
surfaces before all settles down safely.
Sometimes accidents have been unknowingly self- inflicted 
by wrongly loading cargo in void spaces, eg carriage of 
napthalene in the void spaces of a liquified gas carrier.
3:2:2 STRUCTURAL SAFETY.
In the case of combination carriers, the design system 
of putting oil and bunker pipelines in a vast "DUCT KEEL" 
creates an explosion atmosphere situation in case of a
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small leak from one of the tanks.
Sometimes vessels are not clearly defined with regards to 
conditions the vessel has been built to encounter. This 
leads to a vessel entering areas where she is not fit to 
navigate, eg navigating in ice.
Postponement of structural maintenance required under 
Classification Society rules does not always serve the 
good purpose they are intended for, and it then serves as 
an accident assisting agent.
Some designs may be good but very vulnerable.
This includes the ROROs. There are also some designs 
which make it very hard for carrying out repairs because 
there hardly exists enough space to put big repair parts 
into the engineroom. Some of the SWATH vessels can be 
cited as examples.
Initial designs of WOWOs C Walk on walk out ') vessels 
which are used for carrying live stocks had some 
problems. Initial stability calculations overlooked the 
free surface effect of the refuse from the animals plus 
the zero means of draining this waste thus allowing 
accumulation of weight where it is not needed.
Tranfer of ownership
Specially designed vessels needing maximum technical 
knowledge to operate, being sold second hand to owners 
who do not have the know how to run these vessels. 
Examples of these are the Ore carriers and tankers 
designed on an assumption that they will be loaded and 
discharged with minimum longitudinal stress, being sold 
to operators who have neither the officers or equipment 
nor the oppotunity to keep stress to the minimum. It may
be undiplomatic to draw an easy conclusion on the reason 
for such an incidence but ignorance to a certain degree 
must be among the predominant contributors to this safety 
hazard. Whether it is the buyer to blame or whether it is 
the former owner to blame is beyond, the scope of this 
paper but what the author strongly recommends is an in 
depth study on how best this problem can be solved.
Accidents have existed, are existing and will always do, 
but their magnitude must be reduced.
Reduction of accidents is always possible if there exists 
inter alia, an effective inquiry system. This system is 
supposed to investigate the causes of the accidents, how 
and why they happened and trying to find the remedy so 
that these accidents do not recur.
Recurrance of accidents will be effectively avoided if 
the lessons / findings and recommendations from the 
accidents are passed to all people / parties concerned. 
Unfortunately this is not satisfactorily so.
Accidents happen to ships, cargo, seamen etc but the last 
persDiT to receive the information concerning these 
accidents is the seaman. In fact he will be lucky to get 
any information apart from instructions /recommendations 
on what to do and what not to do when carrying out a 
particular operation.
The flow chart of information on casuaties should help to 
remind those whose influence could help in seeing to it 
that seafarers get the casualty information, and that by 
not doing so,they are willingly or intentionally allowing 
/ sentencing 156 ships, their cargoes and sometimes crew 
to unwarranted death which could be avoided.
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Flow chart included in the appendix-
If seamen will continue being denied the findings from 
casualty investigations BUT same information is passed 
over to Owners of ships lost, Solicitors of interested 
parties, Salvage associations. Underwriters, P and I 
clubs. Arbitrators, Classification societies and to mari­
time authority of the flag state, then the seriousness 
that the authorities project with regards to safety 
leaves a lot to be justified.
The author proposes the solution as being publishing the 
reports of the inquiries and making them easily available 
to the public. Means shall be provided of notifying the 
public that such reports are ready. Of course they should 
not be offered free, but by the same token, they should 
not be discouragingly too expensive either,
3.3 REFERENCE DATE FOR INTRODUCTION OF RADAR.
Radar was invented during the world war two and 
introduced to the merchant shipping in the late 1940s. 
In the early 1960s,the majority of the west European and 
American merchant shipping vessels had radar installed on 
them. IMCO Cnow IMO) was established much later than the 
introduction of radar on board. Since from IMOs resolu­
tions one can only go back to a resolution adopted in 
19th November 1981, the author finds it wise to take 1960 
as the date of introduction of radar on board ships.
The paper would like to draw the attention of the readers 
that special radar training courses were introduced in 
the United Kingdom in the 1950's.
The paper takes Collisions and contacts as the radar 
associated accidents.
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3.4 REFERENCE DATE FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF INERT GAS, 
COW, ETC.
Similar complications existed for fixing a particular 
date in this section. 1970 has therefore been considered 
as the date of introduction of inert gas and COW systems. 
Fire and Explosions are taken by the author as the 
accidents associated with these systems.
3.5 REFERENCE DATE FOR INTRODUCTION OF MODERN WEATHER 
FORECASTING INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENTS.
Different dates of introducing weather routeing for ships 
exist among the pioneers being Netherlands, USA and UK. 
1970 will be taken as the reference date because it is 
only a few years after weather routeing for merchant navy 
was introduced .
Foundering is associated with this. It is the type of 
accident which can be avoided if the vessels know of the 
bad weather and find shelter before being hit by the 
weather.
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4.1 PHILOSOPHY OF UNSAFETY FIRST, SAFETY SECOND.
Corrective measures are always done after an incidence 
has occured. So long as a system works properly or 
satisfactorily,its known faults can be overlooked until a 
big catastrophy happens. Pressure from the public which 
eventually ends up to political pressure will result in 
corrective measures being taken.
Since bad publicity is assumed bad for everyone though to 
a varying degree, bad incidences are met with different 
responses from diferent regions. It is common to hear 
people wishing a particular accident to happen to say 
USA. Not that they want the Americans dead, NO. They know 
for sure that if such an accident happened there, effec­
tive corrective measures will be tpiken worldwide and that 
the rate of recurrance of that particular accident will 
be definitely reduced.
The development of SOLAS came from the Titanic accident 
and the Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadis accidents had big 
influeces in the passing of two IMO conventions.
While this paper’is being written, the shipping industry 
is anxiously waiting for the changes that will come in 
the structural safety and operational safety of ROROs, 
from the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry accident whereby 
188 lives were lost.
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4.2 THE UNSAFETY SET
The road to complete safety is too long and it does not 
seem to be properly charted either. This means that the 
road is unsafe. The approach taken by this paper is to 
try to balance the forces that contribute to SAFETY.
UNSAFETY + MAN AND TECHNOLOGY ----- > SAFETY.
The domain of the unsafety set is unlimited in resources 
but man and technology have very limited resources. 
While man and .technology are supposed to work together to 
fight unsafety, it is usual to hear of occasions where 
the?se two have worked against each other and thus helping 
unsafety.
The positive sign in the above expression indicates 
positive contribution from man and technology, which 
means maximum tendency towards safety. The negative sign 
means the contrary.
The unsafety set can be said to contain all elements that 
contribute < in one way or another ) to unsafety for 
example weather, man, cargo, design, regulations, ship, 
environment, technology, etc.
It is an established fact that human error contributes 
about 8G% of accidents to marine activities. This leaves 
the rest 20% to other causes.
Human errors may be categorised in two main groups.
Those caused by inability ( errors due to incpmpetency > 
Those caused despite ability C Errors despite Competency)
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The most effective corrective measure to errors caused by 
inability is to provide proper education and training to 
the crew and all those concerned.
Corrective measures to Competent errors would include 
training all concerned in compulsory procedures to be 
followed while performing their duties and setting up 
efficient watch organisations. Competent errors are easy 
to trace when they are genuinely committed, but they can 
be very hard to trace if they are intentionally done. The 
use of modern equipments in simulating accidents help in 
indicating the possible causes of the accidents and 
corrective measures can be applied accordingly,
4,3 TREND OF ACCIDENTS FROM COLLISION AND CONTACT AFTER 
THE INTRODUCTION OF RADAR.
Problems existed in acquiring consistent data. Table 1 
contains total losses casualty returns from 1949 to 1975. 
From this table the accidents from collision can be put 
in two different groups. A consistent group of an yearly 
average of about 15.4 ships lost from collisions with a 
marked low of 7 in 1954. This is from 1949 to 1962.
From 1963 to 1973 the yearly average rose to 29.
The author takes the view that the increase ivi number of 
small ships and improper use of the radar can be regarded 
as the main reasons for the upward trend of accidents. 
Another reason which should not be overlooked is the 
people's knowledge of the importance of reporting of 
accidents.
From table 4 which covers the period between 1974 and 
1985, and also dealing with vessels of 100 gross tons and
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over, there is no marked difference in yearly figures 
except in 1978 and 1979 when losses from collisions were 
56 and W7 respectively, but the average during the rest 
of the period has been around 35.
Table 3 is of much interest to the paper because it has 
relevant figures. Relevant in the sense that they are of 
vessels of 500 gross tons and over, which are the ones 
covered by IMO regulations. If a three year running ave­
rage is done, the following figures are obtained, for 
collisions and contact respectively. The figures are 
correct to one decimal point. F^eriod 1974 to 1986.
19, 19, 24, 26, 24, 24, 20, 20, 14, 12, 11.
6, 4, 6, 5, 7, 7, 8, 8, 7, 5, 4.
From these figures it can be noticed that the trend is 
definitely on the reduction side. From 1980, ships 
involved in collisions have been below 13 except in 1982 
when there were 20 ships involved. In 1986 there were 
only 7 ships lost from collisions. The author takes the 
view that if the figures for the whole period from 1949 
were consistent, that is for vessels of 500 gross regi­
stered tons and over, then the trend would have been the 
same. That is, general decline of accidents from 
collisions and contact, with few occasions when the 
accidents go up.This view is taken because the ratio of 
accidents of vessels of 500 gross tons and above to those 
of over 100 gross tons is about 0.6 :1 and if this 
factor is considered from 1949 with acceptable 
adjustments,the declining trend would be noticed clearly-
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The STCW 1978 convention which requires watchkeeping 
officers to have undergone radar training could also be 
viewed as being one of the main contributors of this 
decline. Improvements in radars eg magnified screens, 
platting screens, better performances and back-up radars 
for bigger ships decreased the mean time between failures 
of radars since a redundance system was now installed. 
Improvement to the collision regulations especially to 
the section dealing with conduct of vessels not in sight 
of one another. The provision of proceeding at safe speed 
has reduced the concentration of vessels at an area which 
had very poor visibility. The old rules required that 
vessels be stopped which meant increase of vessels in 
this area where visibility was poor and thus increase in 
encounter rate.
Investigations and research on collision- prone encounter 
angles have enlightened the seafarers of the most 
dangerous angles of approach and managed to make them 
more cautious. All this could not be achieved without the 
facilities made available by modern technology.
The paper suggests that a minimum distance be spelled out 
below which vessels shall be considered to be in close 
quarters situation for crossing vessels.
This can be based on distance below which collision can 
not be avoided plus a constant. This constant is the safe 
margin. This is well within reach of the equipment that 
is on board today.
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4»A TREND OF ACCIDENTS FROM FIRE AND EXPLOSION AFTER
INTRODUCTION OF INERT GAS SYSTEMS, COW, ETC.
If we take 1970 as the base mark for inert gas ,COW 
systems and installations of modern fire detecting and 
sensors on board big ships, then the trend is as follows;
From table 1.
There is no significant change in the number of fire / 
explosion accidents from 1949 to 1964 being mostly below 
10 accidents annually.
However the figure increased to an average of 18 
accidents anually from 196B to 1970, the lowest being 13 
and the highest being 2S. Between 1971 and 1973 the 
figure increased to an average of 30 lowest being 27 and 
the highest being 32.
From figure 3 it can be seen that fire /explosion 
accidents seem to be following a cycle which has upward 
movement for say 4 to 5 years and th^n downward trend for 
another 4 to 5 years. However the ships lost from this 
cause are too many. This is the leading cause in the 
total losses at sea.
Early detection of fire coupled with compulsory fire 
fighting course for officers and improvement on qualities 
of fire extinguishers will continue to help to reduce 
these accidents.
As seen from the tables, these accidents are very few in 
tankers. This can be attributed to specialization in 
the tankers themselves,improvement in cargo handling 
equipments and procedures, and training offered to crew.
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This specialization which is afforded by the available 
technology,makes it safer for particular commodities to 
be shipped in these vessels.
General cargo ships carry all that is left from the 
speciallized side and part of the accidents are 
contributed by incompatibility of cargoes.
The author is very much worried with the term general as 
applied to the ships and wonders whether it is safely 
used. The paper would appreciate if more investigations 
are done as to what can be considered safe enough to go 
in a general cargo ship.
4.5 TREND OF ACCIDENTS FROM WEATHER AND FOUNDERING.
Accidents in this area have been increasing steadily from 
35 in 1949 to 94 in 1970. From 1971 to 1985 the annual 
number is above 100 with peak being 169 in 1978.
Small vessels contribute quite a lot to the picture that 
is being projected by these figures. But if we look at 
table 3, the figures from weather and foundering are 
almost steady at around 70.
This is an area where improvement is going to be very 
slow because the contribution from technology towards 
reduction of accidents resulting from weather is very 
limited,as it -is over run by the economic situation.
Once at sea, the best that one can do is to avoid maximum 
effect from the weather but dogging it completely may be 
very hard to achieve due to economic constraints, ship's 
position at time of bad weather and from some other 
reasons. Short term forecasting can be relied upon but 
caution is definitely needed for long term forecasting.
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4.6 TREND OF ACCIDENTS FROM STRANDING.
For vessels of 100 gross tons and above, two groups can 
be made from the accidents record. Those ones with an 
annual rate of below 70 which is from 1949 to 1961 with 
an exception of 1951 which had 82 accidents. The rest is 
of above 70 with majority being over 100 mark. Again most 
of these accidents are from small crafts which come under 
the 500 gross tons. While they may have the equipments, a 
lot of doubt is expressed on how good the equipment is in 
position fixing, and how qualified the user is, in using 
the equipment and in normal safe watchkeeping.
The figures in table 3 indicate the trend for vessels of 
500 gross tons and above. The trend can be taken to be 
decreasing very slowly. Passage planning is expected to 
decrease these accidents even further so long as all 
Colleges teach effective passage planning. Availability 
of two modern radar sets on the bridge gives the naviga­
tor the option of using one set for safe navigation and 
the other set for passage planning.
4.7 TREND OF ACCIDENTS FROM SHIPS AGE.
Table 2 is dedicated to this.
As days go by, man improves on technology and corrective 
measures to past mistakes make newer ships better than 
the older ones. It is the aim of the author to assume 
that modern technology will be found on newer ships.
Table 2 is divided into 5 year age categories of ships. 
Each category has three types of ships being Tankers, 
Bulk and Containers, and the last one being Others.
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It can easily be noticed that the lesser accidents happen 
to younger' ships. The trend reverses in the last two 
columns for Tankers, and Bulk and Containers. The main 
reason is that not many ships from these types live to 
see those years. Many would have already been taken for 
scrap. The ones that still operate are normally in very 
good order and that is the reason for having less acci­
dents. Of course modern technology on the ships bacomes 
more effective if it is assisted by modern ship opera­
tion. In most companies, it is normally the best crew 
that is posted to the newer ships. The crew is generally 
safety concious and very responsible. This is another 
factor which help in having less accidents from younger 
ships.
4.8 MAN - TECHNOLOGY RELATIONSHIP TOWARDS SAFETY.
In dealing with man - technology relationship, the 
question of safety is usually overlooked or taken for 
granted because most of the attention is given to econo­
mic and social factors. During the old time, mechaniza­
tion aimed at removing people from accident- prone duties 
was met byffierce strife from the people who were taken 
out of work. The situation is still the same though to a 
lesser degree. In this modern time, a lot of explanation 
is done so that both parties understand the objectives of 
the mechanization. Mechanization and automation has 
taken over all industrial processes where high risks 
accidents to health and safety exist. This has reduced 
the number of accidents and injuries to people because 
the number of workers is low. In areas where unemployment 
is high, or where capital is short, health and safety is 
thought of more in percentage rather than in terms of 
total number of injuries.
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This has one advantage of hiding the total number of 
accidents and since labour in such areas is cheap, ratio 
of injuries to total labour force is very minimal and 
false impression of safe picture is portrayed.
Before embarking in a mechanized and automation exercise 
a thorough survey is needed to compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of putting either man or machine to do the 
particular job.
The human being is preferred in jobs which need the 
following properties.
-•Less capital and high availability 
-Overload tolerance 
-Self protection 
-Flexibility in performance 
-Decision making needs reasoning 
—Interpretation of unclear signals 
-Adaptability to new programmes 
-Ability to cope with unexpected events 
-Learning from experience
-Human beings for some reasons are needed.
Machines are preferred in jobs which need the following 
properties -
“Taking orders of varying degrees
-Resistance to radiation, temperature, toxic 
hazards
-Mechanical power 
-Routine work is carried out 
-Quick acquisation of information 
-Disposibi1ity
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-Human being can not work due to lack of space etc 
-Safer for machine but not so for human beings.
For example shift work that can be done by 
machines need not be left for human beings 
-Morally degrading 
-Stress and strain causing jobs.
Source: Industrial hazard and safety handbook by King 
Magid + Own addition.
Decision on what to choose with respect to the above may 
be easy but sometimes a good study is necessary especial­
ly when liability to errors is involved. Man makes errors 
but due to the fear of responsibi1ity,once he detects an 
error, he corrects it promptly while the machine rarely 
goes wrong but should it do so, correction is not easy. 
Sensing of errors is easier by modern machines. The human 
being has also a variety of senses but it sometimes beco­
mes very hard to detect some important signals.
Another area which needs a lot of consideration is the 
man - machine interface. Accidents are often caused by 
misjudgements and hazards arising from the machine 
themselves. This is mostly due to inadequate information 
and sometimes the information from the machines renders 
itself ambiguous to interpret and this leads to the mis­
judgement from the human operator. Where man - machine 
interface can not be avoided, due regard shall be taken 
to make the interface a perfect marriage. All applicable 
favourable conditions of modern ergonomics should be app­
lied to make the man - machine interface a successful 
one. That is, aimed at increasing safety and not too much 
overrun by economic and social factors.
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Safety is associated with risks or accidents. What is 
not safe is either dangerous or risky. One of the main 
aims of technology is to make it convenient for the 
worker to perform his duties and at the same time 
increase performance output and safety.
This chapter is divided into two parts.
the first part covers general knowledge on reliability of 
equipments and matters associated with it, and briefly 
touches on the existence of risk and encounter rates.
The second part relates the equipment cost to safety. 
This has been done through brief explaination and worked 
examples.
5.1 SUCCESS ANALYSIS OF EQUIPMENTS
Quantitative success analysis of equipments depend on two 
f actors:
Reliability <R) which is the probability that an 
equipment will perform successively within the 
intended period of time in a stipulated enviro-- 
ment.
If Q is taken as the probability of failure of same 
equipment, then P<R) + PCQ!) = 1
meaning that PCR) = 1 ~ P(Q>.
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Equipment failures can occur in three life stages of an 
equipment.
Early failures which occur in the "running in" period. 
These are mostly due to substandard components or poor 
workmanship during assembly of components.
Random failures which occur at any time of the equipments 
life period.
Wear out failures which occur after useful time of 
components. Mainly due to fatigue, age, etc.
Another factor which needs serious consideration is the 
t/T ratio, where t is the required opierating time and T 
is the mean time between failures.
When t/T is 1 reliability is 0.368
.„+• /TPCQl = (. 1 e ) and since
PCR) = 1 -- PCQ) then
PCR) = 1 - t; 1 - e“^"^"'":) = e"’*^''"''.
To increase reliability the t/T ratio shall be as small 
as possible.
Mode of operation of the system plays a big part as well 
in system reliability. If two equipments are operating in 
series and each with a reliability of say r, then the 
system's reliability obeys the Product Law of reliability
_ r-K-r <■ r = individual reliability ')
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If say r = 0.9 then system reliability = 0.9 * 0.9 = 0.81
Should the same equipments be operating in parallel,
then failure probability of each = 1-r
Probability that both will fail = C 1 - r 
Should r remain as 0.9 then 1” 0.9 = 0.1
Probability of both failing = < 0.1 V" = 0.01
Giving system reliability as 0.99
In order to keep the reliability as high as possible the 
following should be considered as important.
“If funds are there then buy equipments of very 
high reliability according to available funds
-Encourage the use of parallel redundant systems
“Installation of standby equipments
-Equipments to be used under prescribed optimum 
environmental conditions
-Equipments to be handled by people who are duly 
qualified to use them
-Manufacturers manuals of instructions to be 
■ followed closely
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Redundant systems are costly, they increase complexity 
and maintenance load. Sometimes they may stay for a very 
long time without being used BUT the weight of their 
function when their services are called for, can never be 
parallel with anything else within the given conditions.
Means shall be provided for early detection of 
malfunction of system and the faulty components should be 
identified by the detection system.
Improvement of enviromental conditions by controlling 
temperature, humidity, shock, vibration, corrosion, 
erosion, radiation, friction etc can not be strongly 
stressed because the paper takes the view that in this 
computerised phase, the sensitivity of the equipments is 
common knowledge at least to the people addressed by the 
paper. Most of the conditions asked for, for high 
reliability are well taken care of at sea except 
redundancy system which is not done in most of the ships.
The high accuracy of radar and ARPA ,coupled with their 
high reliability satisfy by far the required IMO stan­
dards of performance as stipulated in Resolution A 477.
Some ARPAs have extra facilities like the Possible Points 
of Collision which help in indicating possible points of 
collision with other ships. The main problem with modern 
equipments is proper compatibility with the operators. 
Many accidents are caused by this problem.
The man - machine interface is the area which needs more 
attention for optimum use of equipments and the human 
resources. It is from the solution of this problem that 
the contribution of modern technology can be appreciated.
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5 EXISTENCE OF RISK
Different methads of establishing the existence of risk 
in a particular situation do exist. While statistics can 
be fully exploited in this situation, the problem with it 
is that it depends on past history of particular 
occurances in a given area. Accidents do not happen in 
the same area all the time, mostly because never does the 
same situation occur in the same area. Time factor will 
also add to the problem because an area may undergo many 
changes in traffic density and traffic regulations. This 
leads to data being collected from different points of 
references. This may also lead to irregularities in mag­
nitude of accidents during same intervals of time. Thus 
you may find unproportional number of accidents happening 
during corresponding intervals. Sizes of ships involved 
in the accidents and nature of the accidents influence a 
lot on the recurrance of accidents. All these are condi­
tions which need consideration for risk measurement.
In determining existence of risk, boundaries need to be 
defined beyond which the risk becomes less significant 
for immediate response.
Distance from the ship to the boundary will be called 
ship domain which was defined by E.M. Goodwin as the 
effective area around a ship which a navigator would like 
to keep free with respect to other ships and stationary 
objects. The domain would vary in size and shape 
according to maneouvering characteristics of a ship, 
traffic density in the area, speed of vessel,visibility, 
water available, how well the ship is equipped both 
equipmentwise and manwise.
Since this paper is mainly involved with the technical
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aspect of the subject, consideration will be given to the 
ability of the vessel to detect its presence in the 
domain and the possibility of averting dangern This means 
that within the domain there must be a smaller domain 
below which no action can succeed in averting danger. 
This domain was called the "HARDCORE DOMAIN" by Fujii.
The word encounter has been used by most authors to mean 
the penetration of a vessel in another ones domain. Just 
like domain, encounters do vary in degrees of risks they 
carry. An encounter with a slower vessel from the stern 
when overtaking is generally less serious to an encounter 
with a crossing vessel , or a head ovi vessel . An encounter 
with a stationary object should pose minimum risk if pro­
per consideration was given before the encouter. Encoun­
ters with bad weather vary in degree of dangers as well.
Modern position fixing equipments, not only do they offer 
reliability and accuracy but also availability within the 
IMO requirements (being able to get the ship's position 
at all times). Therefore with the technology currently 
present, measurement of existence of risk is possible.
5.3 ENCOUNTERS
An encounter is said to have occured if a vessel enters 
the domain of another vessel, or generally the area of 
danger.The higher the number of encounters the higher is 
the existence of danger in that particular area. 
Encounter rate is the number of encounters per unit time. 
Number of encounters with danger depend on many factors, 
among them being season, time of day, vessels speed, area 
in consideration, etc.
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The probability of encountering bad weather in the North 
Atlantic in winter is higher than in summer.
This leads to the understanding that the probability of 
sustaining damage from weather in winter is higher in 
than in summer in this area. The lesser the speed the 
longer the vessel will be exposed to this type of danger. 
The contribution by technology to this factor is the 
availability of vessels capable of trading in these 
waters during such season, modern weather forecasting 
methods giving reliable predictions,and the seasonal load 
line rules to be observed.
When it comes to ships, the encounter rate between ships 
indicates the probability of collisions. But this is only 
true to a certain degree. When navigators become aware of 
a risky area, a lot of preparations are done to see that 
a safe passage is executed throughout this area.
At the back of this document, an annex on encounter rates 
is included for detailed information.
5.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EQUIPMENT COST AND SAFETY
FACTOR LEVEL.
rH£ BjrrEmEss of qualitv EEmiA/s lone aetee the
SNEETNESS OF LON PFICE IS EOFEOriEN. (Part of Eothenburg
Modern technology as applied to ships, it means, inter 
alia, ship automation.
Ship automation system consists of:
-Bridge automation
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Engine room automation
-Cargo hand 1ing,cargo plans,stability,stress,etc 
-Administration management- use of computers 
—Ship safety control
-Telecommunication etc
Ship automation system is expensive and very taxiing to 
the ship owner. Cost verses benefit analysis is necessary 
to convince the ship owner of its justification in being 
applied to the ships. The ship owner is already 
overburdened by the existing expences of ship operations. 
We should refrain from the common notion of branding ship 
owners who resist investing on non fully explained 
technological adventures as putting commercial consider— 
rations before the lives of his crew. What we should try 
to do is to convince the shipowners that installation of 
technologically advanced devices does not only increase 
safety or helps in maintaining the existing level of 
safety, but could be commercially attractive.
The author would like to point out that Decca navigator 
is not a mandatory equipment on board the ship yet it is 
fitted on in majority of ships, plying in Decca covered 
areas.
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5.4.1 THE EFFICIENCY OF SHIPS OPERATION DUE TO
NAVIGATION ACCURACY
Navigation as it is today,is collection of data,fi1tering 
the data, selecting the filtered data and optimally 
manipulating this data to privide a highly efficient 
control of the ship's movement along a designated path. 
Generally, the more sophisticated a navaid is, the more 
precise navigation is expected from its proper applica­
tion. As indicated above, more sophisticated equipments 
mean more expenditure to governments / shipowners and 
thus the understanding to their resentment to efforts by 
IMO and other international bodies of trying to increase 
number of mandatory equipments for installation on board 
ships.
Three main factors may be benefited from the above 
subtopic.
-Savings in the running time of ships
-Savings in fuel consumption
-Reduction of marine accidents.
Savings in the running time of ships can be performed by 
reducing error in position fixing and reducing error in 
dead reckoning between fixes. These errors can be elimi­
nated by using sophisticated navaids whose accuracy is 
precise thus eliminating position errors due to equip­
ments, and if the availability of the equipment is conti­
nuous, then there will be no need for dead reckoning. 
Global Positioning Satellite receivers meet the 
continuous availability requirement if and only if the 
controller allows it to do so.(Controller is the owner of 
the system.)—
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Another contributor to savings in running time is reduc­
tion in propulsive losses owing to the optimal steering 
control. The influence of control performance upon 
propulsion of the ship is long known. The losses are 
caused by additional resistance to ships movement due to 
rudder action and inertial drag arising when yaw and 
lateral drift occur simultaneously. Propulsive losses are 
especially pronounced during sharp turns where the ship 
velocity may be reduced by 25 -30 per cent. It can be 
shown that the relative increment of ship's velocity 
relates to ship's movement parameters as follows:
dv = K.J + K.-pW^’
V
Where dv = relative increment in ship's velocity 
V = Ship's velocity
and Kj, are constants
and are variances in rudder angles
and ship' s rate of turn respectively.
An eKample may serve as illustration.
Imagine two similar ships with different navaids
Let ship 1 have conventional navaids and ship
modern sophisticated navaids equipments.
in them.
2 have
Let t be running time per voyage in days
R be running time at sea in days
B be berthing time ie time in port in days
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be running time coefficiency
^ " ^'R tf, = t
R -t-.]^R _ p I Savings in 1
t^R tiR ' ^
t.-. _A — 1 -■
t'^
Let n = number of voyages per year
T ' = Operational time per year in days
n.i = _T_ n.-, = T
i! = 1
n ^ t2 1 - tp
Let Qv be quantity of cargo tranfered during one voyage
Q.1 = n.| Qv *
Q.-. = n.-.Qv
jL
Qo =
jL. '■’2 = 1Q-l "1 1--^tp
Maintenance expenditure can be obtained as follows;
=■ t.jm Where m = daily expenditure
e = maintenance expenditure per voyage
e^ = toin
Saving of 
Ae = e.j 
= C t.iR -
voyage maintenance 
= <; tj - t-. ) mA 1 ^ ^t,2R :>m = ^5
expenditure
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Maintenance expenditure anually
^Em = Ae-^n.]^ = mT^^tp 
Since n.j = T
Savings in investment returns
Ae^
<ki
Where C = Building cost of the ship
d = Depreciation coefficient (Initial investment)
If the life cycle of the ship is 15 years then d = Q.15 
Ae.] = dC(Q2 -I) = dC Q2 - Q.]
Ae^ = ' 1 - 1 )
CCl -- tp) )
1 tp
Example.
Consider a container ship with the followings
DW “ 1A720 tonnes
V = 15 knots
T = 336 days
0.7
m = 6540 dollars per day
mf = 3000 dollars per day ( fuel consumption )
C = 13380 thousand dollars
u = 1100 dollars per one thousand deadweight
d 0.15
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cy
 r
\ 
C\
/
LOW ORBIT SATNAV RECEIVER C2;) 
C Tff/^A/Sir OR TSIMADA.)
Pp = 0.5 nm
"X = 1.0 Hour
Kpp = 0.8 nm / Hour
^ pp = Kpp * = 0.8*1.0 = 0.8
})= (. 0.5^’ + 0.8^;)'^^^ = 0.9 nm
“^tp = Kv C )
Kv = 0.00A4
■^tp = 0.00A4 ( s'-" -- 0.9^' ) = 0.036 = 3.6%
Yearly Economy in fuel consumptions 
" ifbpmfT
= 0.7 * 0.036 * 3000 * 336 = 25A0D dollars
OMEGA RECEIVER (1)
= 3.0 nm 
= 0.0
= Pp = 3.0
AEff
TOTAL COST EFFICIENCY 
omitted
•^tpCmT + dCl +4P;u.D ~ C^m + dAC)
no records 
for open sea
considered 
neg1igible
= 0.7 * 0.036 ( 6.54 * 336 + 0.15 * 13380 ) 0.15 * 5.0
= 105 thousand dollars.
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The total cost efficiency is constituted bys 
--Maintenance expenditure saving 
-Investment return saving
-Reduction of losses due to navigational accidents 
Example 2.
TRANSIT RECEIVER GPS RECEIVER
=1.0 Hour X = 0.0 Hour
. 2 = 100 Metres
95%
1 ^ Pp 50 Metres
^ "*• '“Pr- -I-
Dp =0.8
50m
0.027 nm
tp - Kv «: '^'"2:’
tp = 0.004AC0.9-- -0.027'-;) = 0.0036 = 0.36%
Tranfering to fuel economy:
* tp * mf * T
= 0.7 * 0.0036 * 3.0 * 336 = 2.54 thousand dollars per 
year.
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ACCIDENT REDUCTION RATE
Accuracy consideration.
R normally between 0.5 and 2 nm R = o.5 nm, P = 0.86 
Percentage of navigational casualties =0.8 covered by GPS
P = 0.86 * 0.8 = 0.688 
Total cost efficiency:
Eff= 0.7 -X- 0.0036 (. 6.5A * 336 + 0.15 * 13380 !> +
0.688 * 1.1 * 14.72 - 0.15 * 5 = 19560 dollars.
MORE CONSIDERATION ON FUEL CONSUMPTION
Let f be specific fuel consumption per 1 unit of Engine 
horse power.
Let P be Engine horse power.
Total fuel consumption per voyage F = fPt 
<only running time is considered ') .
F + /!^F = f C P H- ,6p ) C t + )
F + Af = fPt + fAPt + fPAt + f APAt
this is a small part
dividing by F = fPt
AF = AP + At 
FPt
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it can also be shown that ^t =
t s V
Small deviations on engine power are directly 
proportional to deviations in speed.
= k Av where k is the constant of proportionality 
P V
A F = <k ”1) Av + As 
F vs
Considering two ships of same dimensions we can obtain 
difference in fuel consumption as follows:
= <: Af) - ( A F )
( F )1 C F :)2
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6.1 FORCES INFLUENCING MANNING. '
Manning of ships is influenced by many factors among them 
being Regulatory bodies, owners, unions, shiptype, trade, 
economic situation, past experience, etc
6.2 REGULATORY BODIES.
Manning of ships is regulated by the National Maritime 
Administrations. Each ship should have its own manning 
scale depending on a number of independent factors. 
Labour situation, safety consideration, ship size and its 
equipments, crew qualifications, national and internatio­
nal instruments are among the guidelines that govern 
manning of ships,not forgetting article 94 of the United 
Nations Convention on Law of the sea. Crew number should 
not be reduced solely because the ship is highly automa­
ted. Relationship between independent automated functions 
and their combined performance towards safety should be 
thought of before decisions are made. A one - man bridge 
watch system in a highly automated ship would raise many 
questions if such a ship has no toilet on the bridge.The 
watchkeeping officer may need the toilet during his hours 
of watch. Working condition of the few people must also 
be taken into consideration. Many more factors are there 
which differ both in strength and magnitude.
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6.3 OWNERS.
Owners would generally like their ships to carry the 
minimum number of crew required for safe and economical 
passage. Advancement in ship automation will continue 
until no more benefit comes from crew reduction.There is 
strong belief that owners are in the process of grading 
the existing crew to safety, economical and social, with 
the aim of having full control over possibly the 
economical and social crew. The author does understand 
the already heavy burden that the shipowners have 
especially with high manning expenses, made worse by the 
soaring educational and training expenses.The author does 
not sympathise though, with shipowners who intentionally 
underman their ships and end up with accidents that could 
be avoided.With the recent experience of the RORO ship 
Herald of Free Enterprise, owners need to show more ini­
tiative in seeing to it that manning is not reduced to an 
unsafe scale.
6.4 UNIONS.
The unions are generally interested in getting as many 
people on board as possible. They also do understand 
that too many people in a work area increase the 
probability of failure and thus add to the possibilities 
of the risks of accidents. Since unions are supposed to 
control their members, a strong union is necessary to 
ensure that only capable people are sent to sea. They 
should be capable to such a level that unnecessary super­
vision shall not be called for when one is assigned to a 
job. Incompetent people who might have been sent to sea 
because of the notion, " It is who you know and not what 
you know " should be discharged from the ship as soon as 
possible or hold a rank which fits them.
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6.5 SHIPTYPE.
The type of ship should be considered when manning is 
done.
Some of the factors that need serious considerations ares
Cargo carried --- > Where the cargo carried is too
dangerous such that no much repair or maintenance work- 
can be done on board when the vessel is at sea, the 
vessel should carry just enough people for the duties 
intended to be done on board with due consideration for 
emergencies. It is easier to deal with just the right 
number of people during an emergency than having to deal 
with more than needed to operate the ship. It is also 
easier to rescue and put to safety, fewer people than 
maviy. Sophisticated ships which have many automated faci­
lities, need to carry enough crew for the ships safe ope­
ration. A lot of study in ergonomics is needed to come up 
wi'th a safe manning scale especially in very new sophi­
sticated vessels. Ovie man bridge watch system will soon 
be applied everywhere but nobody knows how many ships are 
worth applying the one man bridge manning scale. Again, 
how many bridges have toilets? Is the duty officer goincj 
to call the master every time he wants to go to the toi­
let ? Will the master be there at all the time when he is 
needed ? Do the bridge wings have means of knowing what 
is going on in -the bridge or are the regulations going to 
tie the watchkeeping officers only in the bridge 7 A few 
designs of the bridge of the future ship have come up 
with completely enclosed bridges and wings- While low 
bearings may be ably taken from the bridge and wings, 
high doubts exist as to whether sights can be observed 
conveniently.lt is the view of many that the time of the 
sextant are long time gone but should we not take it out 
of the requirements first before we start contravening 
with the legally existing rules and regulations i
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6.6 TRADE.
By trade, the paper is more concerned with type of 
cargo,duration of voyage and frequency of trips. While 
small ships which ply in coastal waters are normally 
allowed to sail with few crew,the author feels that these 
are the vessels which require relatively many people when 
compared to the foreign going ships. These ship do not 
normally wait at the roads for pilots thus having no run­
ning time - berthing time delay. Being small ships, dura­
tion of stay in port is very short and since duration of 
voyage is also very short, people working in such ships 
hardly have time to rest before going on duty. The ten­
dency is a long stretch of duty ,followed by a very short 
rest and then back to duty. Again the recent example of 
the member of crew of the Herald of Free Enterprise who 
was overworked to an extent that when he was eventually 
relieved, he went to deep sleep which unfortunately could 
not see him wake up to perform one of the most important 
tasks before the ship leaves port. Consequently the ves­
sel ended up capsizing with a loss of 188 lives. Extra 
cost is what everyone of us is trying to avoid but where 
it is inevitable, it should be met with open hands and 
especially where safety to life is endangered.
6.7 ECONOMIC SITUATION.
Nothing much can be said in this topic except the fact 
that when the economic situation is good then the 
negotiations with regards to size of manning do not meet 
with big resistances as compared to when the economic 
situation is in the doldrums.
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6.8 PAST EXPERIENCE.
f’xperjence jis the best tescher.
There are no perfect answers to questions regarding 
manning. Anything that has no perfect answer would have 
many alternative ways of solving. Decisions made on 
scanty information are dangerous and should be avoided. 
Where people have not got the required experience on the 
matter, they should seriously seek for advice. This will 
save them from the pitfalls of TRIAL and ERROR 
methods,and also from management in crisis which normally 
accompanies such practices. Decisions should be based on 
results from research supported by past experience where 
applicable. Modern equipments (computers, simulators,etc 
') combined with modern ways of exchange of information / 
data coupled with modern thinking, ergonomics included, 
should be able to aid past experience in coming up with 
something better for the future.
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The paper covers many topics and it is hoped that it will 
be of interest and everyone concerned with the topic 
would study it. In reaching the major recommendations 
which follow, the authors consideration was given to 
these issues
-The adverse impact international competition is 
having on shipping between the developed maritime 
nations and its spill over influence to the less 
developed maritime nations
-The growing extent to which technology is being 
incorporated in ships and applied to shipping 
operations
-The growing extent to which shipping companies 
want flexibility and freedom from constraints in 
their operations
-Lack of infrastructure, resources and the drive 
to work efficiently in some of the countries
-Unawareness of current developments in the 
shipping industry and the difficulties involved 
in keeping pace with what is currently going on 
(applies to some countries only)
-The fact that the author constantly remembered 
that he comes from a less developed maritime 
nation
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1. CONCLUSION
Sea transportation is still the cheapest 
transportation mode with the smallest fatal rate™
RECOMMENDATION
In countries where shipping is not developed may be due 
to it not being one of the nation's priorities, serious 
consideration shall be given to exploit the above 
mentioned advantages.
2. CONCLUSION
Delegation of some of Government's 
responsibilities to non government institutions as 
experienced between the government authorities and the 
Classification societies has so far worked excellently 
and there is no doubt that it will continue to do so.
RECOMMENDATION
Delegation of some of Government's responsibilities to 
non government institutions needs to be extended to other 
possible fields.
3. CONCLUSION
Technology - based training is* intially 
more expensive than instructor - based training but it 
becomes cheaper than instructor - based training for 
recurring courses which are conducted for a long time. 
Shipping technology is complex and changes faster than 
accepted by many people in .the shipping industry.
RECOMMENDATION
Where a choice exists,one should go for technology --based 
training. This is a technology based world and everyone 
should try to adjust himself to it. Refresher courses 
should be given frequently / regularly to keep the people 
up to date with the developments in the industry.
4. CONCLUSION
Transfer of ownership / technology will 
continue as uneconomical highly automated ships change 
hands to mostly foreign owners. The guarantee of having 
the right crew for a particular ship will not be there 
for every ship. Manning agents will exist for much longer 
than anticipated. The stress, strain and fatigue from 
long working hours, shift work, less manning, commercial 
pressures for expeditious passage making and from the 
challenges of advanced technology will continue until a 
good solution is worked out.
RECOMMENDATION
When buying a highly sophisticated second hand ship, the 
following shall be considered
“Whether the right people to operate the vessel 
are available
-Whether the influence of modern technology 
towards safety is known eg
Capable people in the country to conduct quick and 
effective investigations.
S3
These investigations will be conducted under pressure 
because the ship has to sail and also developed maritime 
nations investigation costs are unapproachably high. This 
is why the paper recommends capable local investigators 
for less developed maritime nations. Where there are no 
capable local accident investigators,foreign help should 
be considered.
Where evidence exists beyond doubt that a crew agent 
supplied unfit crew for a ship with knowledge, steps to 
stop this bad practice should be taken against such 
agents.
The questions of fatigue, stress, strain from the effects 
of advanced technology re^quire the utmost attention.
5. CONCLUSION
Advanced technology has had a marked 
achievement in the reduction of accidents at sea 
especially in collision and groundings,and the same trend 
is noticed in the specialized carriers with regards to 
losses from fire / explosion. Not much impact is noticed 
in the weckther associated accidents. With regards to age, 
the younger ships enjoy the least number of losses.
RECOMMENDATION
The question of reliability of equipments must be 
constantly stressed. The mean time between failure that 
is indicated for a particular equipment shall be the 
least one of the different components making up the 
equipment. Technology should be allowed to advance. 
mr BE NOT AT ITS ONN PACE, BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE 
CONTPOLLED TO SUCH AN EXTENT AS TO HINDEP ITS FPOSPESS.
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6. CONCLUSION
Government maritime authorities are the 
governments bodies overseeing maritime affairs. 
Credibility for efficient and effective maritime rules 
and regulations, plus enforcement of these rules and 
regulations is owed to them.
The rules, regulations and enforcement have in most cases 
been adequate, yet nobody is wholly satisfied with the 
current magnitude of the number of losses of ships due to 
maritime accidents. A deep desire to prevent accidents 
seem to be lacking.
RECOMMENDATION
^LL MEAA/S AND /?ESOU/?CES SHALL BE USED TO CULTn^ATE THIS 
DEEP DESIPE TO PPEOENT ACCIDENTS TO ALL PARTIES 
CONCERNED.
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ANNEX
5.3 ENCOUNTER RATES
The Encounter rate is given by C = 2 Rp ( Vr )
where R = encounter radius
p = density of stream
Vr = mean speed of main stream relative to that 
of the vessel.
If all the vessels are restricted to one speed, then the 
relative velocity can be given by
Vr = ( + Vm^ - 2UVm CosO
Where U = speed of vessel in consideration (own)
Vm = speed of main stream
0 = angle between direction of own vessel and 
main stream.
If we consider a vessel with speed U crossing a route at 
an angle 0, such that the main route has a traffic flow 
of Nm ships in time T given by the function f(v)
The mean number of ships of speed V in the main route 
passing a particular point is given by
Nm f(v) dv/T per unit time.
On average these ships will be a distance-
Tv / ( Nm f(v) dv), apart.
If the route is of width W, there will be one such ship
91
in an area T Wv / < Nm f Cv) dv ) thus giving an average 
area density of Nm f Cv) dv / T Wv»
Since the domain radius of the crossing ship is R and the 
relative velocity with respect to the ships in the main 
route is C U"^' + Vm'^ - 2UVm CosQ) , then the 
area in which encounters occur covered by the crossing 
vessel in unit time is given by:
2R C + Vm^ - 2UVm CosO)
Average number of encounters per unit time
= 2R CU’'"' + Vm"^' - 2UVm CosO^'^'^Nm fCvldv
TWv
Time taken to cross the main route is W /CD Sin D)
Therefore total number of encounters made in a completed 
crossing is
2R Nm fCv;)*aj-"‘ + Vm-"" - 2UVm CosO)‘^•""dv 
TUVm SinO
The total number of encounters for all " V " ships
V = ma-S/
2RNm {fCv)CU^ + Vm^-2UVm CosO)'^'^'"dv
T SinO v=o U V
The encounter rate in such a crossing area for two crossi 
ng routes is
2
-T“S^ 0
(JV
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The encounter rate for a given area gives the navigating 
officer an indication of the level of probable risk to 
his own ship while navigating in such an area. Not all 
accidents happen in an area with heavy traffic, and some­
times areas with dense traffic register less number of 
accidents. Some of the reasons to this fact are awareness 
of the high probability of risk in such areas, proper 
voyage planning, execution and monitoring of the progress 
at different stages while in the area, not forgetting 
proper performance of navigational aids, backed up by 
well trained crew.
From the above formulae, to reduce the number of encoun­
ters, the variation in speeds of the vessels in the main 
route should be as small as possible. This suggests a 
given speed by all vessels within a lane of a main route. 
Theoretically easy to fulfil but practically close to 
impossible due to the fact that current vessels differ 
very much in their safe operational speeds. While this 
may technologically be possible, it definately ie not 
economically viable and as such, it stands zero chance of 
success.
The other possibility is by all vessels to cross each 
other with same speed which is also not possible using 
the same reasoning above.
Thirdly, encounters can be minimised by using an optimum 
crossing angle. According to the formulae above,this ang­
le should be 90 degrees, but work by W.G.P.Lamb on "Cal­
culation of collision risk "indicate minimum risk rate 
occuring at about 60 degrees, when crossing vessel gives 
way and at about 95 degrees when it stands on. 
Corresponding minimum risks per encounter occur at 60 
degrees and 135 degrees respectively. The above figures 
refer to clear visibility condition.
In conditions of restricted visibility the angles for
93
minimum risk rate occur at about 15 degrees and a minor 
minimum at about 80 degrees when main traffic gives way. 
His work also came up with a conclusion that the risk per 
encounter rises in both cases as the course difference 
angle is increased except when the give way vessels are 
the ones in the main route. In this situation the maximum 
is at 55 degrees and the minimum is at 110 degrees. 
Difference in result to angles come due to the fact that 
Mr W.G.P.Lamb got his results using the weighting method 
whereby different weights were applied depending on whe­
ther the vessels were at the boundary of the domain or 
close to own ship. Approaching vessels to the domain and 
the ones which were on the leaving phase were also given 
different weights.
With modern technology, equipments capable of handling 
programs that can give to the navigator, the optimum 
crossing angle for less or minimum encounters are 
available.This, coupled with the existing AE^A facility 
of trial manoeuvre, should be able to reduce the stress 
and strain that the navigators bear in congested waters. 
The other feature of the ARPA which gives the Probable 
points of collisions between two ships, does also help to 
indicate the risks involved between two ships on crossing 
courses. The main problem to the capability of the 
present technology is that it is not yet properly married 
to the collision regulations which are legally binding.
If people will just follow a course because it gives them 
the least number of encounters or the least risk per 
encounter then strict observance to the traffic 
separation scheme regulations will be smeared, 
which may result in an increase in the number of 
accidents especially in the areas with dense traffic. 
Therefore for these findings to be of any value, they 
should be supported by the law ie they should be
94
theincorporated in the COLREGs. Once incoporated, 
remaining can be easily handled by radar, ARPA and the 
man. Another problem may be to justify its need in a time 
when the shipping industry is experiencing a very hard 
economical phase to remain in the game, as once 
incorporated then it would involve acquaring the 
necessary equipments for its implementation.
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PROVISIONAL COST ESTIMATES FOR GMDSS EQUIPMENT’
Shipborne equipment^ Shore-based facilities
No. Equipment Estknated 
cost (US$)
Equipment Estimated 
cost (US$)
1 VHP radiostation capable of 
voice and digital selective 
calling (DSC) communications
5500 VHF DSC 25000
2 MF radiostation capable of 
voice and DSC communications
7400 MF DSC 47500
3 MF/HF radiostation capable of 
voice, DSC and direct printing 
communications
1110() HF DSC -1- radiotelex^
NBDP
150000
90000
4 NAVTEX receiver 1000 NAVTEX 90000
5 INMARSAT ship earth 
station (SES)
Standard-A
Standard-C
30000
30000
5000
INMARSAT coast earth station^ 7-10 million
6 Satellite EPIRB (406 MHz) 500-1000 COSPAS-SARSAT local 
user terminal^
800,000
7 VHF EPIRB
Survival craft equ^ment
2000 INMARSAT satellite CES
EPIRB processing equipment
1,000,000
8 SAR transponder 500-1000 SNp earth station 
for use at RCC
30000
9 Portable VHF equipment 
(two sets)
1100 —
’ Cost estimatss are considered accunts within ± 30% and indude 15% installation costs.
^ The estimated total cost of equipment for ships depends on caniage requirements which are defined in accordance with 
each sh^'s area of operation. The estimetad total cost of equipment for ships sailing in GMDSS areas will be:
area A1 
area A1 -f A2
area A1+A2-I-A3 without SES 
area AI+A2+A3 with SES StaiklaRl-A 
area A1 -•■A2+A3 with SES Standanl-C 
area A1 •fA2+A3+A4 without SES 
area A1+A2+A3+A4 with SES Slandard-A 
area A1 -i-A2-tA3+A4 vdfo SES Slandard-C
9,100-10,100
16.500 - 17,500 
27,600 - 28,600
46.500 - 47,500 
21,500-22,500
27.600 - 28,600
57.600 - 58,600
32.600 - 33,600
For comparison, the cost of providfaig a radiotelegraph station meeting the minimum requirements of the 1974 SOLAS 
Convention, as amended, is in the order of $25,000 for the equipment. However, in most cases extra equipment is also 
provided and the average cost of eqtdpment fitted is $35,000. Tha cost of providing equipment for ships obliged to carry 
only a radiotelephone installation to tm minimum requirements of the SOLAS 1974 Convention, as amended, are in the 
order of $8,000 for the equipment and, if HF RT ia included, $13,000.
^ h has yet to be decided whether these costs should be included in estimates since “regional use" can be rrwde of existing 
coast eartii stations which also provide non-cSstress communications and COSPAS-SARSAT local user terminals will be used 
on shared basis with other services. The s«ne could apitiy to HF DSC.
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ADMAL ONION OF MARINE,' AVIATION AND SHIPPING TRANSPORT OFFICERS *. .X •&/'irtv . -w
cs::35E^
t$pO»‘CMtta•kciidkuwaitl
■ k
TOWNSEND SAID NO
irea. It 
Or pro- J opoB Im war
ID SAFETY CALLS
smeria, 
irwhOe 
rah of 
missed
0 at hi
BOBtll,
really 
lai air- 
Staifc. 
’•crew 
be skip 
N.
THE first {Mut of the five 
week long inquiry into the 
Herald of Fite Enterprise 
drew to a close at the end of 
last month. And when the 
dge consider! hit findings, 
be will do so in the light of 
evidence that Townsend Car 
Ferries officers had consist­
ently asked far, and been 
refused, safety resources 
which would have prevented 
the tragedy. r - : ‘ ,
Mr Justice Sieen and his' 
astettort listened to witnesses' 
fiom the Crc]^ shne staff and 
potsengeri. They have heard 
tUtfies of reniMmlde courage. 
and composure — and smoounti 
of staggalng ndsmana^ment., 
Townsend ‘officials were 
forosd to admit that they tum^' 
down ' officers* requests for
The evidence
TSK' fii ib 
semtary Of State for lyan^Kirt 
and -mocking* rby Mr Justice 
Sheen, -jv...
The court heard that at least 
seven masters had warned about 
passengers overioaihng. Yet the 
shore staff ignmcd adiat the 
judge called cxtrcrndy rtspon- 
^le complainu; a situation he- 
round‘astonishiM*, ■ - j ,
lie fciW B f itf im'lnake aJquMc^wtture from- 
port %as one w the greatest 
problems fiicing aastm ~ !tinie 
agidnst safety*-'
, -<^««hadowii^:ihe
hdd at Chweh Mouse. 
Wbtminister-- hae^lwen the 
httoade^ tw jg^^catt 1S6 
1n>an
---------- twhidishoaid never have
■•happened...
' ,^!^wl^mlfc^Shit Of Jieo- 
brv^ harbour Aio ^Mhu:'aeai'
STATgMPIT not WOMIMC VAImf - 11 miluAKt H«2
Vro^nta has baah Bada tnrarda Cancludln9 -ffruir.nta but -Spirit* 
data baniiist Aa atlll in «cBtaatlon particularly ubtn ena nf tiwta' 
vaaaala la baiadulad aa taabruffa rallat. MaaaftMd rad w ara ' 
ooitravaous aftMWnta and euitan and praetlca In tba eaaa cf tin 
*”*’*’•*•• <*ri*r. Oa nafuta tbti^ aa nc atnanant tpaeltlcally 
ratara t« ‘Spirit* .daaa ahlpa by nana but wa Su tgrmt that thaaa 
aaaaala kaua ^ratad to SaabruMa alth 'Praa SntarprladT. awnlas ' . 
tdiich slSht bt ccaatruad ss cattoa and practlM. , ■ *
rtoa aaparianM in aparatlnt dtk taduind aaanln« tin oitllean si/ ’ ’' 
thaSa vatMli’saaalSat It S'*eaaM and praetlca* bhim tan da ra *' 
thalr Vaaaala ■itaaltatleally imad to provlSa a aata and atricimt 
aarvlca. - . ... .
mua tkU aaaautt;. it adll Siaeaaaln« a«raa«mta M iMM .tasu^suS 
Uint Oanapaaant naapaet tha aaparianM at tbair bmaan-and mb %ha 
Saabrufpa saUat vuaal tc tha aaa. .Mdard at to earran'u'r snl^ ' 
juim4 «A tiM CwUit •pmta. « .a . ixv^ -
-7'“' r
**» «t HM IntetpHM ic ‘te to t«lt« op hum ’OtU'toltoksroggo
57 Mils ^ . ’ta'.
,rr/. ^
The officer’s main role would 
be to make sure the bow doors 
were closed, allowing the first 
mate to go safely to the bridge 
and heto the master. This it 
tundard practice on Spirit class 
ships whro they operate bBween 
Dover and Calais.
But although the additional 
job was at first agreed, it was lost 
when another crew agreed to tail 
without (me. :-
NUMASTh iawyots produeod • thick doMlor of snd- 
ibetf * attempts to gat higher aafety.. dance, charting mem________
etandardt. Court report on page 6
before a massive inrush of water 
‘caused Jt4o heel .over and cap-' 
It, Juu bem cttablidied 
,J>eyoDd doubt that the disaster 
caused because .^ f«ry*t
In February 1982 Union (then 
MNAOA) members were sdD 
watried abont safety — at the 
««rking party statement rgiro- 
duceiL mtf shows. They can-’ 
vassed the views of th& col­
league* and asked again for; 
UKKber mate <» the Merobf.
The company refuted all these' 
requesu on grounds, it said, of 
cost. -'tv.'A.
' *NUMAST members have’ 
demonstrated their ctmeera for. 
the hUiett standards of profes^ 
iionahtm and ufety,* 1^. 
officer Martin Rogers told the. 
Tdetiatdi.''1 believe the court • 
.smhnpretted by tfadr integrity. - 
•bowB in the evidence they gave. 
and the way they gave it. .
. *No -seafarer has made any 
attempt to escape a share of the -■ 
“ nity for this terrible 
It It . something wfakb '
doon had been left epm, 
jBot hedause of anymetbaulw
.'malfiinctkm.
-4. V;' adef bffictt Sabd. ubo 
’Jiad been ki’idiqKe of the'last '; 
jtage bf loatfiiig, did oot'penon-X 
allyisraU to supervise w crew' 
member retpontiUe for doting 
^ doors, assistant-boatswain • 
MarrStaidey. TUt was because < 
^ .requirodi Ib be jat bit. 
baibour station on the bridged
- T^.nect siege i>f dw'iinquiry' 
- wiD look at technical measures to 
-.pre^^any .ymetirion -of the 
~ rapid dfstaMisation whidi led to 
many more deaths than would 
have .oocurted if the HerahTt
. not the car gedc,’be udd
c(w. *To my mind it bad a 
bid»er priwhy^Jt'was'iiJnwe 
v^bnportant |dacelo,be*^^.3^^r^ 
.^t there wouid not havebem 
‘tint conflict of dutfeiif Towns­
end had listened to Its officerg.'>
JMIp iitoidtfbe 
Herald was io' tbe <apdze had been gradual. It will theaafe» of ro-ro fmiet 
Whether tdianget in
asked fortfae of an : imaided.
BiKb as the addition of 
should be recom-
tiohal dec?'$ffrcer butf :lt ls Hk^'''to~he at least a
,'thtcatcsied t^ie acdoo ovti the 
Issue..' . .
:'m(^ before 
published.
any, rqiort it
fern I J -■
■* M-f#?
Oh pages 2,E,9, 10 and 14l..a
Union litfinsCiraiiFf!^
' dC'*- t.
QIBRALTj^ has promised 
action to listen up its strip­
ping register following 
NUMAST dcituuiute for jdic 
enforccnieifit of proper ttan-
dArHc hv th<» flflgy .
ahd get all the' facts^ 
When YOU Invest in a
OPINIONS AND COMMENTS ON SOME MAJOR DISASTERS
To give some examples of the opinions of others, the comments about 
some typical cases are quoted
TITANIC
"Although this inquiry was held with top level legal aid it would seem 
that after all these years the validity of some of its judgments leave 
room for doubt".
DERBYSHIRE
"Major safety probe after ’Derbyshire'.
The Government launched a major safety probe into ship stability after 
the loss of the 'Derbyshire* but refused to conduct an official inquiry 
into the loss of the vessel itself."
Lloyds List 14 May 1981 page 1
ALEXANDER KIELLAND
"Inquiry convened under Norwegian Maritime Law. The Commission of Inquiry 
was appointed by the Ministry of Justice and consisted of 5 men chaired 
by a District Judge."
Lloyds List 5 May 1981 page 14
Det Norske Veritas said that the Commission of Inquiry "over~dimensioned 
and idealised its function and place in the structure of inspection and 
control which is based on supervision of control and repair procedures by 
the builder and operator rather than detailed direct involvement .
Lloyds List 4 April 1981 page 1
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KURDISTAN
%"Wreck Commission stated proceedings were taking too long with too much 
detail being given in primary and expert evidence.”
Lloyds List 7 July 1981 page 1
(in all the Inquiry lasted 10 weeks and cost over one million pounds).
Dr Ewan Corlett giving evidence at the Inquiry said the "maritime world 
should take a leaf from the aeronautical industry's book in the way 
casualties are investigated.
More casualty information should be made available to owners and the 
procedures for investigating a crack in the hold of a ship or an 
aeroplane should be the same.
As soon as an accident occurs, the authorities in the region should carry 
out their own investigation as quickly as possible and send the^ 
preliminary information by telex to the appropriate administrations around 
the world. Then information would be given to classification societies 
for further investigation and information passed to interested parties and 
owners.”
Lloyds List 15 July 1981
BETELGUESE
In a speech in October 1980 Dr Black said of the Inquiry "it seemed too 
much to have the character of a civil action rather than an Inquiry into 
causes. The fundamental nature of the Inquiry seemed to be lost sight 
of."
CUTTLEFISH
Whilst noting the delays in most marine inquiries it must be admitted that 
the judgment delivered on the skipper's certificate was delivered only 
about 10 months after the stranding.
It is understood that the Department of Trade have a formulae for deciding 
whether a casualty is of a serious nature or otherwise and thus merits 
the cost, time and trouble of an inquiry. It would be of interest if 
someone from the Department would outline their basis of decision making.
In the event that every accident were investigated besides adding consider­
ably to the cost it would mean that the operating personnels' certificates 
and livelihood would be at stake and where the loss was purely commercial 
this may be too severe a penalty.
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Extracts from the main report Volume 3
Chief author, M. Willemse; Contributors, J. A. van Riet, E. Monnerup, J. F. Levy,
A. de Bi^vre
Enforcement traffic management 
functions
It has been seen that rules form the main method 
whereby the organisation for traffic management 
influences traffic. Since such rules are designed to 
improve safety and efficiency, it follows that they 
should be observed and complied with.
There are a number of mechanisms for ensuring a 
high state of observance of rules. The major one is that 
all the relevant decision makers see clear benefits in 
obeying the rules. However, there will be those who 
either are unaware of the rules, or who choose to break 
the rules for whatever reason.
Hence the need arises to encourage compliance 
with rules. This has been termed enforcement, 
although CostSOI recognises that such an expression 
can represent one extreme of a series of measures 
designed to achieve the objective of full obseryance by 
all concerned of all the relevant rules. VTS, by virtue of 
the information it can acquire, can have a role in the 
enforcement of rules.
The general scheme for studies of the enforcement 
functions of traffic management is shown in Fig. 3.4. 
Enforcement is concerned with rules (Box 1) which 
must therefore be identified.’The extent to which each 
rule is complied with can be measured in terms of its 
state of observance, the parameters of which must be 
defined (Box 2). For any authority—e.g., a VTS —to be 
able to enforce rules, it must first detect any non-com­
pliance, and the parameters which can be used must 
be identified (Box 3). VTS ad part of the organisation 
for traffic management can take a number of actions in 
an enforcement role (Box 4). A number of factors (Box
Figure 3.5: Collisions In the Dover Strait, 1960-79. 
5), some of which will be influenced by VTS, can 
affect the actual state of observance of rules (Box 6). 
This actual state of observance will have an effect on 
the safety and efficiency of traffic in the area and on 
pollution (Box 7).. >
Studies on enforcement functions 
Within the general scheme shown in Fig. 3.4, outline 
studies were carried on within Cost301 on the follow- 
irjg topics:. .
(a) Rules: the typology of rules, jurisdiction and summary of 
rules to be considered (Box 1).
(b) The existing situation regarding the state of observance 
of rules and enforcement measures, leading to rules 
which should be better enforced (Boxes 6 and 7). .
(c) The pararheters which can be used to detect non-com­
pliance (Box 3). ' ■
(d) The factors which affect the state of observance of rules
(Box 5). ;* * . ■ . „
(e) VTS enforcement functions and information (Box 6).
i------------------ ’ iPFBCT gr turn
ttMt m MSCPWMittt i 1 • iPPICItllCV• rouuTicM
•l:' - ,, -fivi
r,i
' Figure 3.4: Parameters 
relevant to enforcement 
functions.
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- Airline SSety Record
The long-term trend of improvement in the.passenger safety record for the 
scheduled air services of the world (international and domestic) was reversed in 1966 
for the first time since I960, the fatality rate-^r 100 million passenger-kilometres 
rising from 0. 35-in 1965-to-0.40-in-1966-and the-number of passengers killed increasing • 
from 684 to 908- (The figtires ,axe sUll preliminary but are unlikely to be altered by 
more than 1 or 2 per cent.-)-It seems-clear,-however,-''that this'deterioration-in the , 
accident rates, can he' regarded as a temporary phenomenon due to the chance occurrence 
of a number of.serious^accidents to relatively large aircraft with uriusualiy high load 
factors.:!: t-.'JoJ ;• : i-jjli:. . I "-sv-.zrzi I
• This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that these accidents all occuri^ed in the
first quarter of the year when there were some 400 fatalities more than would be ^
expected according to previous first'quarters.’' Such-occurrences may be‘expected to 
take place from.time to time according to-the rules'of statistical probability, | .v.; •
following quarter, with only 31 fatalities as compared with previous second quarters at 
kbout 150, was as exceptionally 'goo'd as the first quarter was exceptionally bad,- and the , 
remainder 6f the year showed a ^satisfactory improvement when compared with the 
second half of 1965. The statistics suggest that during the present decade the total ^ 
number of passehger fatalities due to flying accidents oii the scheduled air services of 
the world is likely.to average about'750 per year, .and to vary any individual ye^ within 
200 of that figure." Since the average in the previous decade from 1.950 to 1959 was , ■ 
about 450 per year," the long-period trend bf this'total would seem to be upwards, 
although in 1964 and 1965 it seemed to have flattened' off.? .0 -
i ^ * 1 *• • r* i t ^ k * * o •« 3 ^The last'eolumn in'Table' 6 shows, -for the first time in these Reports, figures 
of fatal accidents per 100 thousand aircrzift landings,' which are now available_ffom the 
year I960 (although the figures for the first three ye^s had to be estimated from other . 
data and are therefore sonnewhat tentative). The exposure to risk of accident is' 
generally recognized to be related to the number of landings made dr'stages flo-«m since ; 
the majority of accidents happen during the approach, landing, |or subsequent take-off 
and climb-out. Even some of the en'route risks are more related to the number of 
stages, flown than to the distance covered (e. g.v‘ breaking "cloud, passing through storms). 
It will be observed, however, that the fig\ires of fatal accidents per 100 thousand ; ,-i. : 
aircraft landings vary in a closely similar way to those of fatal: accidents per 100 million 
kilometres flown, although falling somewhat more slowly. "^This is because the average- . 
stage length flown on -scheduled-air-services and-hence-the-number-of-stages flown "for ~ 
any given distance is nearly constant from year .to year .withra. slight tendency to^;i :r--:.-' ' 
increase in the long period.
aJTZi'i ■' j.'i. •/li 1.
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Table 6
Accidents with Paaaenger Fatalities 
■'•a
i : v?;; : , -: . ’Scheduled Air'Servfces "Jr .t"J . • v--iiw i ' '
. - ’ - . ^ ^ ^ 1. .. .... * .
r - T j: It . j . , -1950 - 1966* J -■ J; *'■!
^ .
” i '“I t t .1 **.
Accidents in which. Fatality rate per. • ■ Fatal accidents per r**"' '*f-
passengers were killed 100 million 100 million. .' Fatal ■ J .■ ‘ Z f .At&i .
■ Tear Number of accidents
Oi-i.- ^’3
Number of. . r» *?• fiM'r;
; J *4 j'f ^ •/ f-:;:*3r £ £ . accidents . 
pe^r-100 000
.accidents 
per-100 000
to pass.'- ■passengers PasT. -kzn.^ Pass. Km. flown Mi. “flown ' aircraft ■ ■ ‘aircraft -
carrying kUled hours landings .
aircraft
1950 . .’27 ■‘551 '■ ■ ' *1.97 ' ' '■3.15' * t..: r . ••!1.88 ' ^3.02 '■ 0.'54 '
• c" . i f; • ;r.:- • *• * "5 “ - • . # -: V r 'C.' M.t..- ; T .'V/ : Z . fT.;..“ I1951 -.■■20,or. ■'i •■M3. , .r!2; 01,_rr- . • 1.99 •; 0.36 r*. r.Vu... .
.1952 V-2*l '"386 ■;.* =-:o.'97= - ■*-\l “18 "-V ‘'’l;90 ' ‘ ‘ O. 35 . £.-:•£r.; s-U:
i
' •' Z TS.* ■ • i't ^•r.3qir.’-’o -. t 1‘. JiA- ^
1953.. . - 28 - .... 356 . . ■ -..0-77.C,: • ,:1. 44 /f2.,32; .r8.=43 i J„... ..■
■-■-28 '•••‘■-:447.’,- • .- 0,86 ' " ;'-l''36‘"’^ - 2; 19 ‘ 0, 42 - t, ■ i •
1955
-.j- • » '‘: .Jli..) vi • .'i*:-* •• ' “ir. U
407 .. 1..07 . 11.14 >. 82 . 8- .36 - • ■>•(■.’
1956 27a/ . ■ E-552 - . -- 0,78 “ ■•'■1.25 . 1.06 1,71 0,34
..;■• .’
1957 31 ■ '
- a 3 w j . .
507 . 0, 63 ^ i.oo,
. • j ‘ . t 1 ■
. *•'  ^6 . ,y 0. 36, r - ■
1958 30 615 . 0. 72 : - - ^-in6 ;'i ^ : 1.02 - 1.65 > ■ 0:34' '
1959 28 611 0.63 . -. »• 02 _ ., .0.91 . ■ l.'*6.., .. 0. 31
I960’ .•:’’32s/,.’. . ;■ 847 - - .0.78 . .1..25 :ir03 - • 1, 66 : 0.37 1 -o', 49 '•
1961 '25 805 ■ p,69 ' 'lill'"
.1
p.'eo ■. ...i,2^:‘ bV'32 .
V 0. 38 ■..
1962 ■28 : -■ i765 .. 0, 59 - .0.95 : 0.86 . ..'-ij 39 -f . 0.-36 . ■ • P;42 ..!
1963 io’ ■,-■'717 •' V4 9 ' ' 0.78
‘i' *
V 0.88}. >•: . • 1.41 ~ • .0.38 ','^0.45
1964 : 658. .-8,38 ;0. 62 n . - :. 0. 65. 1,05 i . - 0.29 .. 0.33 -
1965 24 ---; - • ■ 684 /■’ ■dC35 ' '-/'O. 56 b. 59 ■ 0.94' * o.ii' . -'b. 32
1966e \2*i/: : . .908 . . rO. 40 f j ■ 0.- 64 ; tj ,;... 0. 54. ; ,1,0. 88 r 0.26,.'
i. i .• •
sc--0.31. )
Notes: Includes a-Wd>pir-eolllsion coonted'a* one accident. ''' i v. • a . ■
• Prellminar/figures. :: •! i: •--ri.:'■i>
Exclusions; ■ - , •
TOe People's Republic of China, the USSR and other States which were not members of 
ICAO as at 31 December 1966.
104

Annual Report of the Council — 1985
Table 1-18. Aircraft accidents involving passenger fatalities on scheduled air services, 1966-1985*
Year
Aircraft
aeddents
Passengers
killed
Passenger 
per 100 
Pass.- 
km
fatalities
million
Poss.-
mile
Fatal aeddents
per 100 million per 100 000
Km Miles Aircraft Aircraft
flown flown hours landings
1966 31* 1 001 0.44 0.70 0.69 1.11 0.33 0.40
1967 30 678 0.25 0.40 0.57 0.91 0.29 0.35
1968 35 912 0.29 0.46 0.57 0.92 0.31 0.38
1969 32 946 0.27 0.43 . 0.48 0.77 0.27 0.34
1970 28 687 0.18 0.29 0.40 0.64 0.23 0.30
1971 31 867 0.21 0.34 0.44 0.71 0.26 0.32
1972 42* 1210 0.26 0.42 0.58 0.94 0.34 0.44
1973 36 862 0.17 0J7 0.48 0.77 0.28 0.36
1974 29 1 299 0.24 0.38 0.39 0.63 0.23 0.30
1975 20 443 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.43 0.16 0.21
1976 20* 734 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.41 0.15 0.20
1977 24 516 0.07 0.12 0.30 0.48 0.18 0.24
1978 25 755 0.09 0.15 0.29 0.47 0.18 0.24
1979 31 878 0.10 0.16 0.34 0.54 0.21 0.29
1980 21 812 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.36 . 0.14 0.20
1981 21 362 0.04 0.06 0.23 0.37 0.14 0.21
1982 26 764 0.08 0.13. 0.29 0.46 . 0.18 0J15
1983 20* 809 0.08 0.13 0:21 0.34 0.13 0.19
1984 16* 228 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.26 0.10 0.14
1985* 22 1067 0.09 0.15 0.20 0.33 0.13 0.19
1. Owing lo incompleic diu, the USSR b not inchided.
2. Indudes one mid-nir eoUUon shown here u one ncddent.
3. Indudes two mid-air coUisions shown here as two.accidents.
4. Includes one collision on the ground shown here as one accident.
* Preliminary figures.
compiling accident statistics. According to this preliminary information there were 22 fatal aircraft accidents 
in 1985 involving 1 067 passenger fatalities in scheduled services. These numbers do not take into account 
the crash of a Boeing 747 aircraft in the Atlantic, wiuch resulted in 307 passenger fatalities, since the cause 
of this crash is still under investigation. In 1984, there were 16 fatal accidents and 228 passenger fatalities 
(see Table 1-18. Table 1-19 and Diagram 5).* Relating passenger fatalities to the volume of traffic, the number 
of passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger-kilometres increased from 0.02 in 1984 to 0.09 in 1985. The 
number of fatal aircraft accidents per 100 000 airendt hours flown increased to 0.13 in 1985 from 0.10 in 
1984 and the number of fatal aircraft accidents per 100 000 landings also increased to 0.19 in 1985 from the 
previous rate of 0.14 in 1984.
The safety levels are significantly different for the various types of aircraft operated on scheduled 
passenger sendees. For instance, in tur^jet aircraft operations, which account for about 95 per cent of the 
total volume of scheduled traffic (i.e. passenger-kilometres performed), there were 7 aeddents in 1985 mth 
861 passenger fatalities (see Table 1-19); in turbopropeller and piston-engined aircraft operations, which 
account for about 5 per cent of the sdieduled traffic volume, there were 15 aeddents with 206 passenger 
fatalities. The fatality rate for turbo-jet aircraft operations was, therefore, far lower than for propder-driven 
aircraft. This difference may, to some extent, be explained by the route patterns and the general operating 
environments of the two categories of aircraft, as well as by the superior reliability of the turbo-jet engine.
4. It may be acted that for 198S, as for earlier years, the ICAO record of aeddents and fatalities is probably incoaiplete in reference 
to smaller urciaft in commuter or air-taxi types of operations, both scheduled and non-scheduled. This shortcoaiins is bdieved to 
be insigm'ficant in the over-all safety picture of commerdal air tran^ort.
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■ Non-Scheduled Commercial Operations
Non-scheduled commercial operations include both the non-scheduled flights of scheduled airhnes and all 
air uansport flights of non-scheduled commercial operators. Data available to ICAO on the safety of non- 
scheduled passenger operations show that in 1985 there were 28 fatal acadents with 506 passenger fatahties 
compared to 37 fatal accidents with 146 passenger fataUties in 1984. . . „ . u ,
In non-scheduled operations performed with aircraft of more than 9 000 kg take-off mass, whether by 
scheduled airlines or non-scheduled operators, no fatal accidents were recorded in 1984, whereas m 1985 there 
were 5 fatal accidents vnth 443 passenger fatalities. . .
^neral Aviation
Complete statistical information is not available on ^ety in general aviation operations, that is, other than 
scheduled and non-scheduled air tr^port operations. In 1984, it is estimated that general aviation aircraft 
were involved in some 1 000 fatal accidents and the number of fatalities in these accidents was about 2 050. 
The number of fatal accidents per 100 000 aircraft hours flown was about 2.2 in 1984. In Ae United States, 
which accounts for about 70 per cent of all general aviation activities in *e world, excluding China and the 
USSR, there were 490 fatal accidents in 1985 resulting in 937 fataUties according to preUminary information. 
The corresponding numbers for 1984 were 545 fatal accidents and 1 114 fataUties. For the United States, the 
rate of fatal general aviation accidents per 100 000 airCT^ hours flown w^ about. 1.5 in 1985, a decrease 
from 1.7 a year ago.i •: : ■- . r :-'-i
Table 1-19. Number of fatal accidents, passenger fatalities and survivors
.Turbo-jet, turbo-propeller and piston-engined aircraft, scheduled air services. 1978-1985K 
(Total. International and Domestic) .
Classification , . 1978 .. 1979 1980,
Fatal passenger accidents w t '
Turbo-jet - ; . 11* ... 8: .: .. 10
Turbo-propeller -. 9 ...10 . 4
Piston-engined • .- 5 . 13. 7
Total . .. . ...25 31 . •.?!
Passengers killed ■' *
698Turbo-jet 553 "■ 642
Turbo-propeller 154 174 • 86
Piston-engined 48 62 " 28
Total 755 878 812
Passengers surviving
Turbo-jet 658 153 595
Turbo-propeller 65 50 .11
Piston-engined 8 36 3
Total 731 239 -• 609
1981 1982' , 1983 ■ ' 1984 _ 1985*
. Total for 
8 years
I'r: .i. .. ' -TU'r' i •« ^
6 -. 11 r.I3» ... -2 . .: -7 68
9 - .10 ..: .... 7 , 10* . 10 ... 69
, 6 . ..5
-i'- - • ■..4:. - . 5 , 45
21_ . 26 ;■ 20 . - 16• t . ..
22 .182
..
i y. . 0*1. . -: : - ::
194 • 507 ' '■ 762 '=47 = 861 ' 4 264
143 192 - 47 - 165 ■ - 179 - 1 140
‘25 65' ■ - • ‘ 16 - ■ 27 271
362 • 764'
N
•809 228 1067 / 5 675
30 1 094 346 109 93 3 078
•71: - . '66 44 39 25 371
13 - - 5 65
114 1 160 390 148 : 123 . .. 3 514
1.2.
3.
4.
Owing to incomplete data, the USSR is not included. . ^ VIncludes one mid-Bir collision between a turbo-jet aircraft and a smaU pistotMngined airaallon 
Includes one colKsion on the ground between two turbt^jet aircraft (counted as one accident). 
Includes one mid-air collision between two turboprop aircraft (counted as one accident). 
Preliminary ficutes. __________ ■_______________________ _
a training flight (counted as one accitot).
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Accident Prevention on board ships at sea and in Port - ILO 
Publication.
A Statistical Study of Ship Domain - E. M. Goodwin
A Survey of Marine Traffic in the Southern North Sea - E. M. 
Goodwin and J. F. Kemp
Automation for Safety in Shipping and Offshore Petroleum 
Operations - A. B. Aune and J. Vlietstra
ATS and VTS Some observations towards a synthesis - R. 
Bootsma and K. Polderman
Cause relationships of Collision and Groundings - J. E. 
Karlsen and S. Kristiansen
Collisions and their causes - R. A. Cahill
Collision risks for fixed off-shore structures - E. M. Good­
win and J. F. Kemp
Prediction of Breakdown in adaptation; Psychological selec­
tion of Seafarers - Commission of the European Communities.
Education and Training for the Maritime Industry in the 
nineties- G. Zade
Encouter rates in a Marine Traffic Separation Scheme - M. .T 
Barratt
Human Error and Casualties — M. Barnet and P. E. Reeve
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IMO Search and Rescue Manual
Industrial hazard and Safety handbook ~ King Magid
International Conference on ship safety and Marine Surveying 
Nautical Institute and the World Maritime University 1986
International Tanker Safety Conference 1975
Man and Accidents offshore - Sutherland and Cooper
Marine Encounter rates - E. M. Soodwin
Modern Ships: Elements of their design, construction and 
operation - J. H. La Dage
Naval Architecture for Marine Engineers - W . Muckle
Quantitative measurement of Navigation Safety ~E.M.Goodwin 
and J. F. Kemp
Stranding and their causes - R. A. Cahill
Study on Marine Casualty investigations in Canada - B. M. 
Deschenes
The Calculation of crossing collision risk at sea -W.G.Lamb
The estimation of collision risk for Marine Traffic in UK 
waters - G. R. G.Lewison
The risk of ship encouter leading to a collision -G.Lewison 
Ships and shipping of tomorrow - J Lusch, M Schelzel, 
R Bchonknecht and H . Obenaus.
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